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Introduction 
Turkey has been plagued by an extended terrorism campaign 
waged by the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) since 1983. Within 
the past decade a separate and distinct issue, commonly 
referred to as the "Kurdish question" has also evolved, and has 
raised a debate over cultural and educational rights under a 
brood set of reforms for Turkish-Kurds. The Kurdish question 
largely revolves around guaranteeing reforms for 
"underpriveleged" Turkish-Kurds and has received attention 
from Western European countries and the United States. 
Western focus on the Kurdish question has in turn prompted 
Turkey to a certain degree to be more pro-active on the issue 
of rights for its Turkish-Kurd population. However, PKK insurgency 
in southeast Turkey has greatly exacerbated the Kurdish 
question in Turkey so that it has come to be stigmatized with a 
terrorism-affiliated label and existence. For Western 
governments, the Kurdish question is not as laden with PKK 
terror overtones, because there has been a linkage established 
between the PKK polemic and the Kurdish question, a linkage 
which in the Turkish view works contrary to the Turkish 
government's aspirations toward eradicating PKK terror. There is 
a tendency in the Western media in particular, to confuse the 
PKK as representative of a political movement representing 
Turkish-Kurd rights reforms with the larger and distinct issue of 
the Kurdish question. The lack of differentiation over the PKK 
polemic and the Kurdish question has complicated Turkey's 
relations with Western allies. In this study, the Turkish-German 
relationship will be discussed, addressing the PKK polemic 
versus that of the Kurdish question as factors in relations 
covering the period 1984 to 1994. The linkage of the two 
polemics in the West over the past ten years has been 
damaging to Turkey in terms of relations because the two issues 
have not been treated as mutually exclusive. In the context of 
the work, the inherent problem posed is that Turkey treats the 
PKK polemic versus the Kurdish question as two distinct issues. 
Therefore, the linkage of the two issues in the West has been a 
determining factor in the maintenance of Turkey's relations with 
its allies, and in this study, Germany. 
The aim of this work is to discuss and analyze the PKK terror 
campaign in contrast to the larger Kurdish question as factors 
that affect Turkish-German relations. The two issues from the 
outset of the work are to be understood as separate and 
distinct entities, although as expounded in the work, overlap 
does occur to a certain extent. To the degree that the overlap, 
i.e. PKK infiltration into the Kurdish question occurs, is not 
elaborated in detail. The work is broad in scope, and attempts 
to explain the PKK terror campaign versus the Kurdish question 
as factors in Turkish-German relations during the 1984-1994 
period. The work does not attempt to "solve' the polemics 
posed, but rather to discuss and analyze the dynamics involved 
in continuing relations in the face of difficulties posed by the 
two polemics from both the Turkish and German perspectives. 
While no causal relation may be established between the 
PKK's reign of terror in Southeast Turkey and the increased 
attention to the Kurdish question in Western European countries 
and the United States, the PKK and the Kurdish question are 
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internal factors in Turkey that influence external relations. It will 
be argued that the external factor of relations between Turkey 
and its allies is also influenced by the factors of the PKK polemic 
and the Kurdish question. Therefore, through a discussion of 
Turkish-German relations, a profile of the PKK, the PKK-Western 
European connection, decisive actions by Ankara concerning 
the Kurdish question, and an oveNiew of Turkish-German 
relations, will provide a means of better understanding how the 
PKK and the Kurdish question are factors in Turkish-German 
relations. An additional question posed in the work is how the 
PKK and Kurdish issues affect the democratization process in 
Turkey and how relations with Germany might impact the 
process. 
The Turkish Armed Forces' efforts to cordon off the PKK's 
influence have escalated dramatically in the past decade and 
have implications for the Turkish Republic in relationship to its 
Western allies. The tendency to connect the PKK terrorist cause 
with that of the overall Kurdish question has been perpetrated 
by PKK-based operations in Europe and elsewhere over the 
past ten years and has been a factor in hindering Turkey's 
democratization process. PKK terror activities have been 
difficult to distinguish from the larger Kurdish question on the 
agenda of Turkish-German relations, despite the fact that 
distinctions are apparent. 
Turkey commenced at a late date to introduce the PKK terror 
polemic to Europe and the U.S. largely because it could not 
define the threat of the pro-Kurdish insurgent force with any 
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precision. Relations with countries such as Germany were 
adversely affected because Turkey was hailed as an 
undemocratic state in the Western media due to allegedly 
harsh treatment of the Turkish-Kurd civilian population 
(approximately l 0 million) living within its borders. The fact that 
the Turkish-Kurd civilian population has been considerably 
compromised and infiltrated by PKK militants and sympathizers 
was not a distinction established early enough so as to 
adequately explain why Turkey's Armed Forces had so harshly 
handled PKK terrorism in the Southeast over a ten year period. 
Also obscured was how thousands of Turkish-Kurd civilians 
would come to be caught in the crossfire. 
A casualty of the successful rise of the PKK terrorist organization 
in Turkey is relations with other states. Of special import in this 
thesis is the relationship between Turkey and Germany, which 
has pursued a fluctuating course for the past thirty years. The 
course of Turkish-German relations were perhaps effected by 
the growing number of Turks and Kurds residing in Germany, the 
Turkish-German trade relationship, an integrating Europe, and 
Turkey's rapid growth as a developing country and a secular 
influence in the Middle East and Central Asia. 
The PKK and the Kurdish question as factors in the Turkish-
German relationship will be discussed in this study as they have 
serious implications for regional relations as well as the Western 
alliance. Germany has a Kurdish expatriot community of 
approximately 500,000 people who are more or less 
incorporated into its 1.8 million Turkish population. As time 
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progresses, the post-1923 republican tendency to identify one 
community (i.e. citizenry) with another is disintegrating, and 
factionalism and animosity is on the rise in both Turkey and 
Germany. Integration of the two communities, Turks and Kurds, 
who have coexisted for hundreds of years, is breaking down 
into an ethnic battle of words and actions that due to PKK 
insurgency and heightening media in both countries potentially 
threatens to divide the Republic of Turkey along ethnic lines, 
and to a certain degree, disturb Germany's civil order. 
Perhaps the quintessential problem involved in the Turkish-
German dynamic vis-a-vis the PKK factor, is the lack of reliable 
factual information regarding the terrorist and counter-terrorist 
maneuvers conducted over the past ten years in Turkey's 
Southeast and in cross-border operations into Northern Iraq. 
This is compounded by the fact that successive Turkish 
governments in the 1980s failed to convey the seriousness of 
the PKK problem to the Turkish public and intelligentsia, as well 
as to Western allies via electronic and print media. Perhaps this 
is because the Turkish government did not understand the 
emerging phenomena itself. Coupled with the shrewd 
strategies of PKK storefront organizations in Europe and the 
Middle East, the terrorist insurgency aims of the organization 
were able to escape closer scrutiny and be misrepresented by 
press coverage which intimated that the PKK was a political 
movement working towards the achievement of cultural rights 
for an oppressed Kurdish minority in Turkey. 
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The estimate for the number of people killed since PKK 
insurrgency began in Turkey's southeast in 1983 is 
approximately 13, 500. This figure is based on a comprehensive 
Western government estimation (i.e. Europe and the U.S.), 
intimating the numbers could be higher. Turkish security report 
figures concur with a potential variance of l,000 ( +/- 8%). 
Information and communication regarding these figures and 
events is hindered by the fact that the Turkish Armed Forces 
restrict access to the Southeast. Operational and casualty 
reports are issued from headquarters in Ankara. The PKK 
meanwhile, quite effectively 'banned" reporters from the 
Southeast starting in October 1993 onwards. Assassinations of 
journalists and burning of newspaper offices were used as 
effective tools. Reliance on Western figures then, inherently 
reflect intelligence findings and data issued by the Turkish 
military, or conversely, PKK propaganda releases in Europe and 
the Middle East. Meting out the truth objectively regarding 
activities and casualties in the wake of PKK terrorism then, is 
complicated and inherently imprecise based on published 
reports. 
Chapter one will define conceptual terms to be utilized 
throughout the work, defining the PKK terror organization and 
framing its role in Turkey as well as factors in Turkish-German 
relations. Chapter two attempts to trace significant events 
covering the 1984-1994 period in Turkey and Germany vis-a-vis 
the PKK terrorist organization's effect on the two states' 
relations, and to detail the nature of the Kurdish question in 
Turkey as a separate polemic. Chapter three will focus on how 
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the PKK terror campaign has affected Turkish and German 
positions regarding the development of armed forces, human 
rights and media issues. Chapter four will concentrate on a 
prospective future for improved relations between Turkey and 
Germany; particularly in light of the PKK polemic and the 
Kurdish question as separate issues, and how relations might 
impact on the coordination of efforts to work toward a 
potential resolution of both . 
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Chapter 1: A Conceptual Framework 
When the term terrorism is discussed in relation to the PKK in this 
work, it will be taken to mean premeditated, politically 
motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant 
targets (i.e. civilians and/or military personnel who at the time 
of the incident are unarmed or not on duty) by subnational 
groups or clandestine agents usually intended to influence an 
audience./ I Such premeditated attacks also qualify as 
terrorism conducted toward armed state military personnel. In 
this work, when the PKK is referred to as a terrorist organization, 
this definition will be operative. In reference to "international 
terrorism", it should be taken to imply terrorism involving citizens 
or the territory of more than one country./2 Thirdly, the term 
"terrorist group" as applied here to the PKK, should be 
understood as any group practicing, or that has significant 
subgroups that practice, international terrorism./3 
Four additional significant terms will be utilized as a means of 
discussing Turkish Armed Forces operational strategy in 
combating PKK insurgency. Methods employed by the armed 
forces, in combating PKK insurgency, have come under 
criticism from Western allies. They impact on Turkish-Kurd 
civilians in Southeast Turkey. It is important to distinguish that the 
PKK poses a military threat to Turkey and therefore must be 
combated militarily. Standardized definitions, commonly 
accepted and in practice internationally, help to frame the 
PKK polemic within the military sphere, especially as a threat to 
the sovreignty of Turkey. Therefore, "antiterrorism" is defined as: 
defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of 
individuals and property to terrorism./4 "Counterterrorism· 
should be understood as meaning offensive measures taken to 
prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.JS "Combating 
terrorism" is defined as actions, including antiterrorism 
(defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist 
acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to 
prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism) taken to oppose 
terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum./ 6 Finally, 
"countersubversion" will be taken to mean that aspect of 
counterintelligence designed to detect, destroy, neutralize or 
prevent subversive activities through the identification, 
exploitation, penetration, manipulation, deception and 
repression of individuals, groups or organizations conducting or 
suspected of conducting subversive activities./7 
The PKK from its inception has been labelled as terrorist and all 
Western governments accepted the appellation. It is only pro-
PKK sympathizers and militants who contest the term. For the 
purposes of this work, the terrorist label will be used as will the 
antiterrorism military terminology as a means of clarifying the 
distinction between the PKK, a terrorist organization with 
insurgent aims in southeast Turkey, as opposed to the Kurdish 
question, which encompasses an emerging agenda toward 
reforms for Turkish-Kurds along cultural, educational and media 
lines. An important definitional distinction must be made from 
the beginning between the Turkish-Kurds and the PKK terrorist 
organization. Turkish-Kurds as part of the citizenry of Turkey, 
comprise a population of approximately l 0 million and have 
lived under the tenets set forth in the Constitution since the 
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Republic's founding in 1923. They are granted the rights of 
Turkish citizens and are educated and speak in a Turkish 
medium. The PKK, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2, is a 
terrorist insurgent organization with intentions to destabilize the 
Turkish republic through militant activities to achieve their aims. 
It should be noted that Turkey does not conduct its census by 
ethnic group and therefore, an airtight figure of the number of 
Turkish-Kurds residing within its borders can not be concretely 
ascertained. Turkey does not recognize a Kurdish minority; all 
peoples are considered to be Turkish citizens of a unitary state. 
Therefore, there is a Turkish-Kurd community within the larger 
Turkish population. Even PKK terrorists whose birthplace is Turkey 
are Turkish citizens. There is no legal "Kurdish" assignation 
granted to the Turkish-Kurd populace residing in Turkey. Out of 
a world Kurdish population of approximately 20 million, the 
unofficial estimate of those residing in Turkey falls between 8 to 
12 million. In this thesis, the l 0 million figure is utilized. Perhaps 
one-half of that range reside in western Turkey, while the 
remaining are concentrated in the country's southeast region. 
Essential to understanding the census practice in Turkey, are the 
tenets of the non-ratified Sevres Treaty of 1920 and the ratified 
1924 Treaty of Lausanne. The latter formally ended World War I, 
and granted settlement terms to Turkey.JS 
Not recognizing a nationality status for Kurds (as well as in 
neighboring countries) in the Turkish Republic produced a series 
of Kurdish uprisings, which were largely religious in inspiration 
and went against the secular founding principles of the Turkish 
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state. There was the Sheikh Said rebellion of 1925, the ihsan Nuri 
Pa~a rebellion of 1929-32, as well as the Sheikh Sayyed Reza 
revolt of 1937-1938. All revolts were suppressed militarily, and 
further government controls succeeded in preventing others. 
More recently the Kurdish question has come into focus in 
Turkey as a means of establishing its distinct character from the 
PKK terror polemic. A poll conducted in March 1992 by the 
Turkish polling institution PiAR in collaboration with the U.S. 
polling firm GALLUP, displayed revealing results regarding 
Turkish-Kurd self-identification and unitary state affiliation with 
the Republic of Turkey. Out of three groups of a total of 2,036 
people polled, 96% of Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin stated 
their desire to live in peace in the same country with Turks in 
Turkey./9 
Compared with earlier Kurdish political groups and revolt 
movements, the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), beginning in 
incipient latent form in 1974, intentionally sought to recruit from 
among the lower classes of rural Turkish Kurds. The PKK, rather 
than working in coordination with traditional tribal leaders, 
sought to undermine and discredit their legitimacy./10 Perhaps 
this was because of its ideological affiliation with communism. 
The PKK can be defined as a Marxist-Leninist oriented insurgent 
group comprised of Turkish-Kurds. Over a ten year period (1984-
1994) the organization moved beyond rural-based insurgent 
activities to include urban terrorism. It has sought to set up an 
independent Marxist state in southeastern Turkey, where there is 
a predominantly Kurdish population. The PKK's primary targets 
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are Turkish Government forces and Turkish-Kurd civilians in 
southeastern Turkey, but it has upscaled its activities in Western 
Europe against Turkish targets. Its strength is approximately 
10,000 to 15,000 full-time guerrillas, 5,000 to 6,000 of whom 
operate within Turkey, and 6,000 to 7 ,000 "part-time· guerrillas 
operating from Syria, Iraq and Iran, with additional sympathizers 
in the hundreds of thousands in Turkey, Europe and the Middle 
East. External aid and safehaven is received by the PKK from 
such states as Syria, Iraq and lran,/11 
PKK strategy for its insurgency campaign against the Republic 
of Turkey may be defined as; l) carrying out a show of strength; 
2) terrorizing rural Turkish-Kurds into supporting the PKK; 3) 
striking civilian targets and clashing with the military if there is no 
other alternative; 4) training new militants; and 5) executing 
attacks with the use of local (southeast Turkey) 
support/supporters./12 The PKK's aim is to carry-out armed and 
action propaganda; activities involving attacks to attract 
public (Turkish and external) attention to the southeast region 
of Turkey. The PKK's aims through these attacks are to; l) cut off 
intelligence from reaching the Turkish security forces; 2) prevent 
local cooperation with the state against the PKK; and 3) 
maintain open supply channels in the rugged territory of 
Turkey's southeast,/13 The PKK's propaganda campaign may 
be further explained under a three-pronged strategy; l) 
"encouragement visits", i.e. random PKK visits to southeastern 
villages through meetings with local peoples, explaining and 
attempting to coerce them into acting in complicity with PKK 
aims; 2) "warning visits" where PKK militants surround a village or 
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outlying southeastern settlement and send a warning, that the 
encirclement could lead to a confrontation if the state-
supported and armed village guards do not hand over their 
weapons; and 3) PKK propaganda activities based abroad, 
acting as storefront organizations for outlawed PKK terrorist 
activities./ 14 
For the purposes of this study, the PKK storefront operations 
based in Germany numbering 35 total which were banned on 
November 26, 1993 by the German government are discussed 
as a means of defining the PKK-Germany "connection", 
intimating the breadth and impact of the terrorist 
organization's network. It was through these organizations that 
the PKK became more efficient in disseminating information 
regarding its maneuvers in southeastern Turkey. It was also 
through the existence of these organizations and their 
effectiveness in perpetuating the PKK terror campaign in Turkey 
that the PKK even became a factor in Turkish-German relations. 
The organizations were a great source of frustration to the 
Turkish government(s) and inactivity on the part of German 
governments to ban them until 1993 made the situation worse. 
The PKK-affiliated organizations based in Germany include: The 
Federation of FG Kurdistan Patriotic Worker Cultural 
Associations (or Federasyona Yekitaya Karkaren Welatparezen 
Chandiya Kurdistan - Feyka Kurdistan), overseeing 20 additional 
off-shoot Kurdish organizations; The Association of Patriotic 
Artists from Kurdistan, and the Kain Kurdistan Committee, with 
(PKK) branches in Mainz, Offenbourg, Russelsheim, Olderburg 
and Dortmund./15 
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Financing -- a critical component in defining the strength of 
any terrorist organization -- must also be discussed before 
further analysis of the PKK polemic vis-a-vis Turkish-German 
relations may proceed. According to security force 
headquarters in Ankara, the methods of PKK financing are 
defined as: l) voluntary donations by supporters of the PKK; 2) 
taxation by the PKK of various peoples; 3) protection money 
extorted mafia-style by PKK militants; 4) small and medium 
business investments; 5) robberies; and 6) narcotics smuggling 
income./ 16 The PKK leadership collects money from truck 
transporters, taxi drivers, car owners, businessmen, narcotics, 
electronics and livestock smugglers, in addition to money 
extracted from regional supporters in the southeast. At the 
Second National Conference meeting of the PKK, held 
between May 3-13, 1990 in the Bekaa Valley, PKK leadership 
elaborated other means of eliciting finances for the movement; 
l) to collect customs duties at the borders (of Turkey, Iraq, Iran 
and Syria), and to levy a duty fee to all smugglers according to 
the capacity and value of their merchandise; 2) to seize all the 
income of "collaborator feudal landlords" who own regional 
lands and to impose taxation on a significant part of the 
"patriotic feudal masses"; 3) to collect road and vehicle taxes; 
and 4) to tax private enterprises in accordance with their 
income. The PKK finance link with narcotics smuggling in 
particular bears significant testimony as to how far the terrorist 
organization's network extends, and how it effects the group's 
operations in Turkey. In 1992, of 41 narcotics sting operations 
carried out in Western Europe, smugglers caught in 23 of the 
apprehensions were part of the PKK drug network, and the 
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drugs confiscated had been smuggled through Turkey./ 17 
Millions of dollars are earned by the PKK through drug trade 
and the PKK is thought to control 30% to 40% of the flow of 
heroin from Afghanistan, Iran and Lebanon through Turkey to 
Europe./ 18 A second source of PKK narcotics comes through 
Iran. Narcotics originating in Afghanistan are processed in 
laboratories located in the 'no man's land" between Turkey, 
Iraq and Iran, with the assistance of the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guards (Pasdaran). After processing, the drugs are transferred 
to Istanbul through southeastern cities, where the PKK has safe 
houses. Turkish trucks with hidden containers are loaded with 
narcotics, driven to Istanbul, cross the border at Edirne, and 
enter continental Europe. The increase of the PKK's 
international drug trade and market is viewed as being 
competitive with established western networks./19 
The network established in Germany and throughout Europe in 
addition to the PKK's drug trafficking have contributed to the 
strength of the organization in Turkey. The information 
disseminated by the PKK has also confounded the separate 
issue of the larger Kurdish question in Turkey. The fact that in 
Turkey the PKK and the Kurdish question are mutually exclusive 
issues is complicated by the way the PKK over a decade has 
effectively managed to halt attempts in the Turkish government 
toward reform for Turkish-Kurds. The continued threat posed by 
PKK insurgency to Turkey's sovereignty in the name of freedom 
for "oppressed" Kurds, has caused the government to avoid 
addressing reforms as long as PKK terrorism continues to rock 
the southeast. PKK infiltration into the Turkish-Kurd population 
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poses the potential problem of inspiring Kurdish separatism in 
Turkey. Additionally, the human rights issue and its ramifications 
for the Kurdish question, has been used by the PKK to promote 
its cause of destabilizing the Turkish state which has lead to 
confusion in the West over the differences and nuances 
involved. 
For purposes of this study, it will be examined as to how 
Germany perhaps through no fault of its own, failed until 1993 
to recognize the distinction between the PKK issue and the 
Kurdish question to the point that it indirectly contributed to the 
PKK's campaign. The fact that the Turkish government(s) have 
not been very effective in conveying the differences and 
defending the Turkish Armed Forces actions also feeds into the 
PKK's terror machine and further confounds implications for the 
larger Kurdish question, including the important issue of human 
rights. 
It is significant that the PKK was able to establish an 
international foothold -- in fact a storefront and safehouse 
network -- over a l 0 year period of time. The question must be 
raised as to how the PKK was able to organize so effectively, 
and through what means can it be combated? A discussion of 
activities which occurred during the 1984-1994 period in 
relation to the rise of the PKK and its implications for Turkish-
German relations merits discussion on the path toward 
constructing a better understanding of the events, dynamics, 
perceptions, and actions of the parties involved. 
16 
Chapter 2: Turkish-German Foreign Relations: 1984-1994 
The number of PKK terror-related events spanning the 1984-
1993 period totalled 10,879, according to Turkish Armed Forces 
accounts. The number of citizens and security personnel killed 
by PKK militants for that same period is nearly 6,000./20 Both 
sets of figures appear to be conservative estimates in the face 
of an actual but unsubstantiated ten year death toll of at least 
13,500. A published PKK file from the Turkish Armed Forces in 
June 1994 placed the total number of deaths caused by the 
terrorist organization at 13, 900 ./21 
Essential to an explanation of how the PKK effects Turkish-
German relations is the fact that in both countries, the PKK 
since its inception has been classified as a terrorist organization. 
The label assigned to the PKK was valid throughout Europe and 
in the U.S., but the PKK was able to work around that 
technicality by establishing agencies and affiliated 
organizations working within a network to help accomplish their 
terrorist campaign aims. The agencies established were legally 
registered as Kurdish cultural, educational, and media-oriented 
associations, but acted as storefronts and surrogates for the 
PKK's insurgency campaign in Turkey. The Kurdish agencies and 
organizations were considered legal under Western European 
constitutional tenets, and it was not acknowleged for several 
years that the PKK had effectively penetrated the pro-Kurdish 
agencies in much of Europe. Turkey was also late in conveying 
its intelligence findings to support the claim that the agencies 
were being utilized to promote the cause of PKK terrorism. For 
ten years, the PKK was able to install and operate a mass 
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communications, banking, smuggling and recruiting effort 
which acted in defiance of the illegal terrorist status assigned to 
it by the German government. In short, the PKK networks in 
Europe undermine Turkey's efforts to attempt to stamp out PKK 
influence, and terrorism raises a question regarding the 
predicament western liberal democracies face in upholding 
their constitutions. For example, the PKK-affiliated organizations 
in Germany were allowed to operate until 1993 due to the fact 
that under the tenets of Article 5 of the Basic Law, there were 
legal. In fact, they were acting as storefronts for the PKK which 
was revealed over time and through intelligence. 
An interesting point in understanding how European countries, 
in this case Germany, must balance constitutional stipulations 
and accordingly define what constitutes terrorism or terroristic 
behavior. As the British scholar Juliet Lodge argues, it should be 
realized that West European states' concern with devising anti-
terrorist measures whilst preserving liberal democratic practices, 
has led them to explore the possibilities of action through 
several European and Atlantic bodies, such as the Council of 
Europe, the Western European Union and NAT0./22 Such 
bodies, as will be evidenced in the discussion, took very limited 
measures against the rise of PKK storefront organizations on 
European soil. The PKK was not officially banned in European 
countries, and was only banned in Germany and France in 
November 1993. Although Turkish intelligence provided 
information to European governments that PKK operations from 
European bases were largely impacting on the terrorists' 
infiltration into southeast Turkey and the perpetuation of its 
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insurgent campaign there, European governments and bodies 
failed to follow-up the information garnered on the Turkish side. 
For example, the Council of Europe and the CSCE over the 
past ten years have been actively engaged in discussions 
about the state of Turkish democracy, and yet, have not been 
particularly involved in the issue of PKK terrorism within Turkey 
and outside its borders except to highlight the ramifications it 
poses towards human rights violations against Turkish-Kurd 
civilians residing in southeast Turkey. The European Court of 
Human Rights, for example, receives numerous cases annually 
in relation to allegations resting on the poor quality and human 
rights in southeast Turkey. The focus has tended to be on 
conditions in the southeast without attention to PKK terrorism 
and the fight against it, which has largely inspired poor 
treatment to suspected PKK sympathizers and Turkish-Kurd 
civilians. 
However, it seemed clear from the beginning stages of 
Turkey's insurgency problem, that the European powers would 
not intervene to prohibit pro-Kurdish "cultural organizations" 
which under their constitutions were legal. Therefore, the 
problem appeared to be Turkey's alone to handle. The success 
of PKK storefront propaganda dissemination was such that the 
Western European public and governments were persuaded 
by PKK-backed Kurdish "cultural" organizations which claimed 
the Turkish state was repressing Turkish-Kurds through 
counterterrorism and countersubversion policies in southeast 
Turkey. 
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A key supposition as applied to Turkey and Germany in the 
face of the PKK threat is that the greater the scale of disaster 
terrorists threaten to generate, the greater public fear is and 
the more likely it will be that an attitude change will occur./23 
This may be the rationale that the Turkish government exercised 
from the beginning vis-a-vis Western states. The Turkish 
government may have surmised that the public would react 
negatively to PKK terrorism, and in that estimation they might 
have been correct in the long-term. However, a substantial 
group of would-be terrorists continue to be persuaded to join 
the ranks of the PKK within Turkish borders, indicating that some 
sympathy for the group exists. There is continued recruitment of 
PKK sympathizers and militants which defeats the supposition 
that the PKK terror movement was so unpopular as not to have 
empathizers. Conversely, the PKK regularly threatens potential 
recruits with death if they refuse to join the organization, 
resulting in a regularly replenished supply of new recruits. It may 
be argued that the PKK used the rationale that terrorism 
activities would influence the progress of the achievements of 
their political aims, among which are a Turkish-Kurdish 
federation, Kurdish political representation in the Grand 
National Assembly (defined along the PKK program's agenda), 
and Kurdish medium education and media. PKK activities were 
masked by the European-based storefront propaganda 
portraying the organization as representing liberation of a 
repressed Kurdish minority in southeast Turkey. Moreover, PKK-
claimed human rights abuses against Kurdish civilians by Turkish 
armed forces in Turkey's southeast helped fuel a powerful 
admixture of Western European state empathy -- if not indirect 
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tolerance -- of the PKK's alleged "freedom fighting" while its 
ulterior motive was to destabilize the Turkish state and redress 
"oppression against Turkish-Kurds". The validity of the PKK's 
claims was colored by the hues of their terror campaign 
intentions. Little documentation in Western academic literature 
or media addresses this problem. The incorrect linkage of the 
PKK terror campaign at the governmental level and in the in 
European media with the larger "Kurdish question" vis-a-vis 
cultural and human rights violations claims greatly complicated 
Turkey's allied relations and has ultimately contributed to the 
PKK's successful rise. 
The lack of treatment of the PKK's media influence in the West 
may be due to the fact that the PKK's campaign since 1990 is 
not qualifiably separatist in orientation. The stated aims of the 
PKK have instead more recently been directed toward 
establishing a federation of Kurds and Turks. The lack of 
attention to the real or perceived threat of PKK storefront 
organizations in Europe therefore, perhaps reflects the fact that 
the PKK continually changes its agenda, and dually pursues 
roles in both Turkey and Northern Iraq. If we are to consider the 
PKK as a separatist group with ethnic aims, such as the IRA or 
ETA, then it becomes all-the-more significant that the PKK 
organization was able to reach its current level of strength 
through European permissiveness toward their storefront 
associations and foundations, and that the Turkish 
government(s) did not work to more effectively convey the 
seriousness of the PKK threat. The same premise holds true if the 
PKK's objective is taken as challenging the Turkish regime, i.e. 
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from a unitary state. to a federation of Turks and Kurds. 
According to Juliet Lodge; 
It is often understood that the more stringent anti-terrorist 
measures a state introduces, the more terrorist groups 
may be able to claim that such measures provide proof 
of the state's "fascist" (and hence reprehensible and 
illegitimate) intentions. Alternatively. terrorists can portray 
authorities who refuse to negotiate or to accede to other 
demands as impossibly intransigent; any subsequent 
decision by the authorities to bargain with the terrorists 
can then be construed as capitulation to terrorism, in 
which case terrorists can claim victory. This has led many 
authors to reason that government authorities are 
placed in a "no-win" situation. Others have suggested 
that therefore, governments have the upper hand: the 
response to a terrorist threat is what matters,/24 
The Turkish government(s) and the Turkish Armed Forces have 
faced just such a dilemma over handling the PKK and Kurdish 
question. Ultimately, the response to the terrorist threat posed 
by the PKK has determined its "no win" position in relation to 
allegations of human rights abuses. The human rights and use 
of force dimensions related to the PKK problem and the Kurdish 
question will be elaborated in Chapter 3. What is of concern 
here is to try to understand the unfolding of events which led to 
the exacerbation of Turkish-German relations over the course of 
the PKK's rise. Compounding the already extant PKK factor in 
the two states' relations. were dynamic changes such as the 
end of the Cold War, defining a new world order, increasing 
cohesion of the European Community into the European Union. 
Turkey's rising industrializing nation status, and the role the 
Turkish republic assumed as an even stronger anchor state in 
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the Transcaucasus region, the Middle East, and a potential role 
model for Central Asia. 
In the larger scheme of events in Turkey, the PKK problem was 
alternatively raised and dropped, to meet the exigencies of 
political need, and oftentimes receded into the background of 
world events. Conditions prevalent in Turkey and Europe during 
the 1984-1994 period favored the PKK terrorist group's rise, such 
as Turkey's move toward stabilizing a democratic 
parliamentary governmental system and the end of the Cold 
War. It was not until 1993 that the PKK organization was dealt 
the harsh hand it could have been dealt earlier in Europe. An 
examination of the beginnings of the PKK as an incipient pro-
Kurdish movement helps to provide the necessary background 
in understanding how the organization grew to its present 
strength over a ten year period. Studying the organization's 
growth outside of Turkey, and particularly in Germany through 
cultural organization storefronts, also provides a basis for 
analysis. The PKK' s European operations, contributed 
significantly to the organization's financial, arms procurement, 
media operations, and propaganda dissemination. 
I. Profile of the PKK 
The 1980 coup which followed the declaration of Martial Law in 
Turkey effectively dealt with subversive activities that had 
reached an apex prior to the military takeover. The leader of 
the PKK, Abdullah (Apo) 6calan, after the 12 September 1980 
coup, managed to flee to Syria. 6calan was to admit that by 
1980, many PKK units had been transferred across the border 
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into Syria and had actually begun their first cross-border 
operations into Turkey. However, under Head of State General 
Kenan Evren. state troops claimed to capture one thousand 
pro-Kurdish militants (or Kurt9u), many of whom, it was later 
suspected included the PKK organization's top Central 
Committee members. The Kurdish militants and the PKK in its 
latent form had been dealt a substantial blow. However, other 
important PKK leaders escaped. and were able to reinitiate 
plans from Syria in the months to follow. General Kenan Evren, 
in what would be among the first of many factually 
questionable statements, declared that the Turkish nation was 
guaranteed that an era of terrorism had come to an end and 
that the country had returned to stability. Furthermore, Ankara 
security force headquarters took credit for the Kurdish militant 
bust, stating that "the head of the snake has been crushed" ./25 
While the statements aptly reflected the status of the nearly 
eliminated Dev Sol radical terrorist movement, they were 
misleading to the public regarding Kurdish militant elements, 
and obfuscated an understanding of the potential Kurdish 
militant threat to Turkey. 
The PKK set up operations in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley 
of Lebanon, home to other Marxist and terrorist organizations. 
At the end of 1981, after holding its first Congress abroad, the 
PKK began sending reconnaissance groups into Turkey close to 
the border area searching for "friendly villagers". Secondary 
militants -- basically PKK foot soldiers -- traveled to Northern Iraq 
either through Iran on false passports or in armed equipped 
groups through Turkey. These were relatively simple tasks 
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because during that period, the border was porous, with 
minimal security force presence. The rugged, mountainous 
terrain only worked to the PKK's advantage,/26 
By 1983, the PKK organized its force to launch a full thrust into 
Turkey, as the Turkish armed forces through intelligence were 
beginning to identify the "bandit" (PKK) threat at its border, but 
could not yet give it a precise name. In May of 1983, Turkish 
troops crossed into Iraq on their first hot pursuit of "bandits". By 
August 1984, the PKK, under the leadership of 6calan, had 
managed to eliminate dissidents within its ranks through a series 
of murders, and moved to initiate a major attack into Turkey to 
prove that the terrorist organization had truly come into being. 
The plan by the PKK was to attack guerrilla style into Turkey, 
targeting local southeast residents who had taken up arms 
under the Turkish state-sponsored village guard system. The PKK 
concentrated its strategy through the "Kurdistan Freedom Unit", 
utilizing the Vietcong model of attacking villages and civilians in 
Turkey's southeast,/27 
The 1984 period in Turkey witnessed an emphasis on 
maintaining order in Turkey, resulting in a failure to recognize 
the growing numbers of PKK guerrilla strength. The PKK 
launched a so-called "Spring Offensive· in 1984 culminating on 
August 15th in the southeast border towns of Eruh and $emdinli, 
where state police stations and military buildings were 
attacked. Two additional attacks in the Siirt and Hakkori 
provinces killed eleven civilians and wounded several others. 
The PKK terror attacks received press attention in Turkey and 
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Europe. PKK activities resumed on October 10th when the PKK 
killed eight soldiers in the <;ukurca district of Hakkari. The Turkish 
armed forces by that same month had sent in a large presence 
of security forces to the southeast region. By December 1984, 
PKK high command militants returned to Syria to plan the PKK' s 
next strategic moves. 
By all estimates, the PKK' s 1984 attacks, while sending an initial 
shock to Ankara, failed to be as impressive as they could have 
been. The high command, under the Kurdistan Freedom Unit, 
planned an annual March 21 offensive to commemorate its 
1984 "Spring Offensive" activities (thereby putting that same 
date -- the Kurdish New Year, or Newruz -- on the Turkish 
calendar as a date to watch for escalated terror). The March 
attacks were to be followed by July-September raids. In 1985, 
Turkey's intelligence operations had substantially increased 
against PKK guerrilla attacks in the southeast, and many PKK 
militants were killed or captured. By 1986, the PKK practiced hit-
and-run attacks, resulting in the deaths of 200 people in 
Turkey's southeast including military personnel. In October of 
that same year, the PKK killed 12 security personnel in Turkey's 
Uludere district of Hakkari. After that attack, Turkish jets stormed 
into Northern Iraq and bombed suspected PKK camps. Ankara 
justified the raids through a "hot pursuit of terrorists" explanation 
(to be used consistently thereafter), and claimed that 150 PKK 
militants were killed./28 There was approval from the Iraqi 
government to conduct the raids, so they were not considered 
between the two states as being extraterritorial. Secret 
advances into Iraqi border territory, the first among many to 
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follow, to weed-out PKK insurgents within the ten kilometer 
buffer zone were being simultaneously conducted. 
The year 1987 witnessed increased attention paid to the PKK 
and Turkish armed forces activities in southeast Turkey. A State 
of Emergency was declared in July 1987 in Siirt, Van and the 
Hakkori provinces, which was extended to nine provinces by 
1989. Additionally, Turkish security forces stepped-up the village 
guard system; arming village recruits to help defend rural 
locales from PKK guerrilla raids. However, the village guard 
system has had more negative than positive effect in the long 
term due to the fact that Turkish-Kurd armed village guards 
have been combating PKK Kurds for the past decade, 
escalating the cycle of violence. The village guard system has 
also become prey to adjunct mercenaries that work for the 
aims of either "side" in the war, complicating the efficacy of 
and justification for the village guard system. 
February 1987 witnessed the PKK's direct targeting of village 
guards and their families. This is a PKK stratgey that continues to 
the present, and tremendously impacts on the civilian death 
toll in the southeast. Additional targets of PKK insurgency in 
1987 and onward, according to the organization's leader 
Ocalan, would be; 
people who are at the top of our political target 
agenda ... the ruling party ANAP, rural governors, lawyers, 
doctors, teachers, and muhtars ... we will use for target 
elimination rockets, TNT and dynamite; when they are not 
available we will use gas bombs./29 
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The 1980-1986 period evidenced the growing threat of the PKK, 
proving that they were not just a handful of bandits, but 
indeed, a fairly organized terrorist group with an international 
network, financing, and safe-haven infrastructure being 
gradually built-up to form a formidable force. 
II. The PKK-Western European connection 
Throughout the early 1980s, the PKK disseminated its directives 
through storefront operations located in Europe. The Kurdistan 
News Agency (KURD-HA), centered in Cologne (Kain), was one 
of the key command posts for printing and sending written PKK 
statements throughout the network in the Middle East and 
Turkey. The Turkish media was a prime recipient of such 
directives through facsimile transmission. The medium of 
dissemination of PKK directives has always been in Turkish. One 
of the most significant PKK-backed such media outlets was 
Serxwebun published in Vienna. It chronicled the 1984 activities 
of the PKK, and was the first to send the target area information 
to Turkey that Hakkori, Van and Siirt would be among the first 
regions to be hit by PKK attacks in the southeast. Whenever the 
Turkish media was to receive an update about PKK activity in 
the southeast, the first contact was the European PKK-backed 
storefront media operations. The PKK media outlets in Germany 
were in essence the mouthpiece of 6calan and the PKK. PKK-
oriented information and propaganda dissemination was such 
a commonly acknowledged practice, that it was a source of 
consternation to the Turkish armed forces and media. 
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The death toll in the 1984-1990 period resulting from PKK 
insurgency activities to secure control in Turkey's southeast and 
the Turkish security force counterterrorism attacks against them, 
was l ,026 Turkish security force deaths, 233 Turkish village guard 
deaths, and the loss of 1,298 Turkish civilians. The PKK terrorist 
death toll was 1,956./30 By June 1994 in a PKK file released to 
the Turkish press concerning the 198 7 to 1994 death toll in the 
wake of the fight against the PKK, the Turkish military personnel 
deaths numbered 2,030, terrorist deaths numbered 5,566, and 
there were 4,227 civilian adult and 388 children's deaths,/31 
The increase in the number of deaths rises annually in Turkey as 
the result of the struggle between the PKK and the Turkish 
armed forces. Incidents outside Turkey rose with the 
establishment of the PKK' s European network. Several pro-
Kurdish related events occured in Europe. For the confines and 
interests of this study, pro-Kurdish and PKK-related events in 
Germany will be discussed. 
In Hamburg, Germany, a Turkish national was caught in 
November of 1986 with plans to assassinate the Turkish consul 
posted there. A message containing assassination orders, a 
gun, 25 bullets and 2 kilograms of explosives were confiscated 
by the Hamburg police. The police interrogated the suspect 
and extracted the information that members of the Kurdish 
Workers Organization of Hamburg were also involved in the 
plot. The organization was subsequently closed down after the 
would-be assassin's apprehension,/32 
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A 1989 survey from the German Federal Ministry of the Interior 
indicated the findings that: 
Approximately 97 ,250 aliens in the Federal Republic of 
Germany were members of extremist organizations or 
other associations influenced by extremists; of these, 
more than 67,450 persons were prone to left-wing 
extremism, 12,000 persons to right-wing extremism or 
extremist national groups, and approximately 17,450 fell 
into the group Islamic extremists,/33 
The survey stated that it had historically been the policy of the 
FRG to follow the activity of alien extremists "through 
determination mainly by combating the political, economic 
and social circumstances in their countries of origin". The survey 
recognized the threat to its internal security posed by the PKK 
when it stated; 
Security forces pay particular attention to those groups 
who try to reach their aims by violent action ... Of late, 
there are e.g. militant Kurds who belong in particular to 
the (orthodox) communist Workers Party of Kurdistan 
(PKK) that largely operates in a spirit of conspiracy ./3 4 
Germany tracked such activities and kept permanent records 
in the form of "looking out• activity through the Federal Office 
for the Protection of the Constitution. Other evidence of 
Germany's cooperation in combating PKK insurgency aims 
within its own jurisdiction, came in the form of the prosecution in 
the High Court of Dusseldorf of 19 PKK members. It was the 
largest terrorist trial of PKK members in Germany, and 
commenced on October 24, 1989. The case was premised on 3 
alleged kidnappings, l murder attempt, and 4 murders resulting 
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from inter-PKK conflicts. The outcome of the trial, decided in 
April 1994, will be discussed in Chapter 3 in relation where the 
criminals will serve their prison time. 
Throughout the escalation of the PKK terrorist campaign in the 
1980s and the Turkish military activities to combat them, there 
alternately was widespread criticism by Western Europe of 
Turkey's handling and lack of attention to Turkish-Kurd calls for 
the granting of civilian Turkish-Kurd cultural, language and 
media rights. However, because Western governments mixed 
the PKK terror issue into the same debate over the larger 
Kurdish question throughout much of the 1980s and early 1990s, 
the Turkish government's and armed force's position was 
compromised and hindered to a certain extent. Turkey's 
repuatation and democratization process was affected as well 
as its relations with the West. 
Although Turkish security forces aimed to stamp out PKK 
terrorism, and its supporters in southeast Turkey, a claim in the 
West was made that in the process, Turkish-Kurd civilians were 
suffering unduly. In particular, accusations of human rights 
abuses and cultural repression were featured in the German 
press. The Kurdish question, linked to potential reforms for 
Turkish-Kurds in terms of cultural rights (celebrating particular 
holidays and events), educational rights (pursuing a Kurdish 
medium education with Turkish as the primary medium of 
instruction), media rights (broadcasting over television and 
radio in Kurdish), and political representation (in the Grand 
National Assembly as a party not affiliated with the PKK). 
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The PKK's insurgency and the larger Kurdish question have 
been mismanaged by successive Turkish governments, as will 
be elaborated in Chapter 3. Proper care toward educating the 
Turkish and Western publics and media as to the true nature of 
the threat it posed was a shortfall of the 1980 and early 1990s 
period by Turkish governments and will be discussed within the 
Turkish context and within the scope of Turkish-German 
relations. 
ill. Decisive moves by Ankara on the Kurdish question in Turkey and 
abroad 
A move by Ankara under the ANAP government of Turgut Ozal 
attempted to soften Turkey's image through two policy shifts, 
which were also politically expedient in terms of Western 
interests at the time. Given the height of tensions in the 
southeast, and all the debate in Ankara, Western Europe and 
the U.S., Prime Minister Ozal let it be known that indeed, there 
was a "Kurdish question" in Turkey. It is widely cited (at least in 
the Western literature) that the Prime Minister claimed Kurdish 
heritage through his mother, and put forward to the public that 
many high officials in Turkey were of similar descent. Previously, 
such open admission had not been introduced as a regular 
feature in the Turkish political arena. Ozal also legalized spoken 
Kurdish in public, although Turkish would remain the official 
language of Turkey. 
The second essential decision on Ozal's part for consideration --
although today it still remains controversial in Turkey and much 
of the Middle East -- was the acceptance into Turkey of 
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hundreds of thousands of Kurds fleeing Saddam Huseyn' s Iraq 
in 1988 for fear of reprisals against them with chemical 
weapons. The setting of the UN-sponsored Operation Provide 
Comfort to help accommodate those refugees was the 
outcome of Western urging to the Iraqi Kurds to push the 
limitations of the Iraqi regime by forming an autonomous 
enclave through an uprising. Thus, Ozal's assumption of 
responsibility for the ensuing safehaven arrangement with 
Western allies for the Iraqi Kurds was debated and criticized in 
Turkey for fear that it would inspire a similar autonomy-related 
revolt by Turkish-Kurds. 
Turkey's participation in the Persian Gulf War further seNed to 
cement its anchor position in the Middle East, and impacted on 
the strength it lent to the NATO alliance. The Poised Hammer 
Operation in Turkey (known internationally and alternately as 
the Provide Comfort II Operation) provided for the legal use of 
the incirlik airbase for air launch sorties during the war. The use 
of the base continues with follow-up reconnaissance 
maneuvers and the operation's mandate comes up for a vote 
of renewal every six months in the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly. 
During the post-Gulf War period, Turkey would grant more than 
60,000 Kurds asylum from Northern Iraq, whereas a mere 450 
were accepted in Western European countries under asylum 
laws. International aid for Northern Iraqi Kurds fleeing the 
country amounted to $5 million, while Turkey assumed aid 
appropriations of approximately $45 million. Additionally, the 
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cutting-off of the Iraqi pipeline in conjunction with the Western 
UN-mandated embargo against Iraq cost Turkey hundreds of 
millions of dollars over the long term, and impacts on the 
country's debt today. It is claimed by the present government 
that Turkey loses $6 billion annually through the Western 
imposed embargo against Iraq. 
Because Turkey is a NATO ally, Western states were naturally 
appreciative that such gestures as those proffered by Prime 
Minister Ozal were so easily put into action, but additional 
political trade-offs for Turkey were not far in the offing. The 
legitimization of the Iraqi Kurd safehaven inspired a further push 
by Kurdish leaders to broaden regional and Western 
understanding of the Kurdish question in its Turkish, Iraqi, Syrian 
and Iranian contexts. Turkey thereby proved its commitment to 
upholding its NATO role and a firm stance as a Western ally, but 
at the same time, the Kurdish question and the debate over it 
were pitched to a new height. The Turkish government's 
rationale was that it could not over ride the fight against the 
PKK toward accommodations on the Kurdish question in light of 
the fact that the PKK had continued to upscale its activities in 
the southeast and posed a formidable threat to the region. The 
Turkish argument continued to be premised on the idea that no 
reforms for Turkish-Kurds could be realistically or safely 
implemented without the eradication of PKK terror. That 
premise continues to the present, despite Western pressure on 
Turkey to revise it. 
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Turkey was unusually forward in its policy decisions taken under 
the Ozal government, but not without some incredible turns in 
debate. For example, Ozal had made the premature (October, 
1988) proposal -- which many critics in Ankara perceived as an 
irresponsible move -- of a federated Iraq with the north for the 
Kurds, a mid-section in the vicinity of the Kirkuk oilfields for Iraqi 
Turkmen, and the remainder for the Arabs. This support from 
Turkey for a federated Iraqi Kurdistan -- albeit having been 
initiated singularly by Ozal -- in the process elicited a promise 
from Iraqi Kurdish leaders to cooperate with Ankara against the 
PKK camps stationed in Northern Iraq. A deal was negotiated 
whereby 15 ,000 Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga mobilized on October 
4, 1990 to drive PKK insurgents out of the Iraqi-Turkish border 
region. Operation Provide Comfort had been installed for 18 
months up to that time, and Iraqi Kurdish leaders waited for the 
day when Ozal's proposed federation would materialize. A 
discussion on federation did not evolve, and the Gulf War 
eradicated Ankara's involvement in any such debate, not to 
mention the resistance posed to it from the Turkish General Staff 
and the Foreign Ministry policymakers. 
Perhaps the politically expedient moves made by the Ozal 
government complicated the multidimensional Kurdish 
problem to an even higher degree. By proposing a federated 
model in Northern Iraq, then backtracking, then taking in 
hundreds of thousands of refugees, and helping to create a 
safehaven for them through a UN-mandated operation --
simultaneously conducting raids into Northern Iraq to extricate 
PKK terrorists and camps -- created fears in Turkey that 
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capitulation to Turkish-Kurd demands could easily be lumped 
into the proposal. In the process, Iraqi Kurds had been 
manipulated, Saddam Hussein had been alienated, and the 
Arab world was outraged by Turkey's policy shift. By conceding 
so much to the West it was argued in Turkey, might Ozal then 
cross over the line into "selling out the country" on the Kurdish 
issue (i.e. to Western interests)? The degree to which critics 
perceived what had been lost and gained by Ozal' s 
maneuvering merits separate discussion, but the fact remained: 
there was no going back for Turkey in addressing the Kurdish 
question. 
IV. Turkish-German relations in reaction to PKK staged events 
While Turkey had taken a very active role in the Gulf War of 
1991 , Germany had not, much to the criticism of the NATO 
alliance. Germany's stance, as stipulated by its constitution in 
terms of non-deployment of troops outside of Germany was 
reiterated. Thus the Turkish government, amongst other NATO 
allies, was able to bask in the glory of the defeat of Saddam 
Hussein's forces ending in a ground war in February 1991. Given 
all of the limelight Turkey had received for its diplomatic and 
pro-Western prowess in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it 
continued to be criticized for its purported mishandling of 
Turkish-Kurd civilians in the southeast as the result of armed 
forces activities there to combat the PKK. The use of force and 
treatment of suspected PKK sympathizers were the two most 
prominent areas of critique. The criteria on which such criticisms 
were made were based on claims of human rights abuses by 
security forces in the region. 
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In January 1992, Turkish-German relations hit an all time low. In 
reaction to the Turkish armed forces use of German-issued 
armored vehicle carrier transfers for patrolling purposes in PKK 
activities in southeastern Turkey, the German government 
moved to enforce an arms "embargo" against Turkey. In 
Germany, footage was aired on television which alleged to 
depict a German-made armored vehicle used by the Turkish 
military dragging a PKK tighter to his death. (It was widely 
published later by the Turkish authorities that the militant was 
already dead). The "embargo", largely in reaction to such 
depictions to the German public, was imposed with the 
justification that German-issued armored vehicles were not to 
be used outside NATO purposes. The Turkish government 
denied the allegations of reported abuse of German-issued 
stockpile NATO equipment and reasserted . that the armored 
vehicle carriers were used for patrolling purposes only. The 
"embargo" period witnessed complications in Turkish and 
German relations, and heightened accusations regarding 
human rights abuses by Turkish armed forces and police toward 
the Turkish-Kurd civilian population residing in the southeast. The 
PKK threat issue at the macro level was "lost" in the process, and 
debate was redirected toward alleged human rights violations 
in Turkey's southeast. The reorientation of the debate led to 
consternation on the part of the Turkish government and armed 
forces, which was escalating the anti-terrorism campaign 
against the PKK. On March 2, 1992, relations were further 
exacerbated when focusing on a so-called solution to the 
Kurdish "minority representation problem" in Turkey, then Foreign 
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Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher proposed a Yugoslavian 
federated model in Turkey. /35 
Ankara reacted strongly to both the German arms "embargo" 
and the proposed federation model by Genscher. Reaction 
reached heights to the extent that there were calls for a Turkish 
"boycott" of German exports in Turkey. This introduced an 
economic angle into the debate, and German companies 
attempted to soften their government's position by explaining 
that although the German Defense Ministry had suspended 
arms shipments to Turkey that politics in no way should reflect to 
the larger scope of Turkish-German import-export relations and 
trade. 
It is noteworthy that the Turkish government found it easier, and 
had throughout much of the 1980s and 1990s, to point the 
finger at other governments for indirectly and directly aiding 
the cause of PKK terrorism. The Pandora's box opened by Ozal 
had been more than Turkey had bargained for in relation to 
the Kurdish question, and its ramifications for the armed forces 
struggle to combat PKK insurgency. By the first week of April 
1992, the German government was assured by the Turkish 
Foreign Ministry that German-issued arms were not used and 
would not be used against civilian Turkish-Kurds living in 
southeast Turkey, and the arms "embargo" was lifted. 
Although the NATO stipulations for use of transfer weapons is 
broad, Turkey attempted to use its own specific interpretation 
as a means defending its position vis-a-vis the German Defense 
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Ministry over the arms issue. The new NATO Alliance Strategic 
Concept agreed upon at the meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council in Rome in November 199 l , reaffirmed a coordinated 
stand against terrorism. Article 13 of the document reaffirms 
that; 
Alliance security interests as being affected by 
risks ... including disruption of the flow of vital resources 
and actions of terrorism and sabotage ... arrangements 
exist within the Alliance for consultation among the 
Allies ... and where appropriate, coordination of their 
efforts including their responses to such risks./36 
The German Defense Ministry interprets this agreement broadly, 
stipulating that transferred German-issued armored vehicles 
and tanks may be used in Turkey in the event of an external, 
NATO-based threat rather than for internal security (e.g. for 
counterterrorism purposes against the PKK), without further 
clarifying the criteria determining how terrorism could qualify as 
a NATO-based threat. 
Prior to the lifting of the arms "embargo·, the German 
Bundestag and government denounced all forms of terrorism 
on April 2, 1992 and stated that it would never allow 
"internecine Turkish conflicts to take place on German soil". The 
Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) on the same day 
ratified a declaration called the "Kurdish Question", denouncing 
PKK terrorism and rejecting the methods used by the PKK. 
Further, it stated that "PKK terrorism blocks the way for Kurds to 
attain more rights ... and that it is a clear misuse by Kurds in 
Germany of their guest rights.· /3 7 
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An important event on April 15, 1993 occured on the wake of 
the Turkish-German rift. PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan moved to 
extend a "ceasefire" with the Turkish armed forces that had 
been initiated in January 1993. The ceasefire was not 
unconditional and "mandated" that the Turkish security forces 
should halt all operations aimed at destroying the PKK. 
Ocalan's additional demands were that Kurdish "politics" be 
allowed to be exercised and that the inclusion of "Kurdish 
identity' be provided in the Turkish Constitution. He concluded 
the list of demands with the condition that a Kurdish federation 
be considered in southeast Turkey. In terms of political 
demands, it is supposed that during that period, Ocalan 
advocated Kurdish-medium education, cultural, and media 
rights for Turkish-Kurds as a means of enlisting additional recruits 
as well as garner sympathy in the West for Turkish-Kurd "minority 
rights". 
The Turkish government would not negotiate with the PKK's 
"ceasefire" demands. The so-called PKK "ceasefire" held, and 
Ankara was in a quandary as to what the next step should be in 
dealing with eradicating PKK terror. Prime Minister Suleyman 
Demirel during this period was acceding to a bid for the 
Presidency, due to the sudden death of Turgut Ozal, who held 
the position. The need to fill the position of Prime Minister 
became the heated issue in Ankara. As a consequence, the 
PKK issue was once again sidetracked, overshadowing gains 
that might have been reached toward offering a next step 
from Ankara in light of the "ceasefire". 
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A coalition government under acting Prime Minister Erdal Inonu 
came into power and shortly thereafter announced a limited 
amnesty to be granted to those PKK sympathizers and 
members involved in smaller acts of crime against the Turkish 
state (e.g. not to include murder). Upon that announcement 
on Sunday May 23, 1993 in the early afternoon by the Turkish 
government, the PKK took a bus hostage on the highway near 
the town of Bingo!. The PKK terrorist operatives detained 33 
young Turkish soldiers for twelve hours in order to coerce 
Ankara into granting concessions to the PKK. Ostensibly the PKK 
leadership feared the loss of their operatives crossing over to 
the Turkish government's amnesty. By 3 a.m. the next morning 
the 33 soldiers were all shot in the face and killed. The Turkish 
government withdrew its amnesty offer, and the Turkish nation 
was heavy-hearted with the loss and frustration of how to 
counter the PKK's latest move. 6calan claimed through the 
Turkish press that he had not ordered the execution of the 33 
Turkish soldiers in Bingol, leaving the question open as to who 
did. 
Upscaled PKK attacks ensued after the Bingol event. The so-
called "ceasefire" of the PKK had been broken, although in an 
ad hoc fashion as events transpired. The PKK supposedly broke 
the "ceasefire" in this manner in response to Ankara's reticence 
to push for further concessions to the PKK. On June 7th, Acting 
Prime Minister Erdal Inonu announced a second limited 
amnesty to be applied to PKK terrorist organization 
sympathizers. He claimed that the amnesty would be proactive 
toward "reclamation and rehabilitation" of those potential (i.e. 
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young and impressionable or older but coercible) PKK 
sympathizers from joining the ranks of the terrorist organization 
against the Turkish state. European governments strongly 
condemned the PKK incident in Bingol, and press coverage 
insured that the brutality of the PKK in this event was effectively 
portrayed, providing the impression that the PKK was in control 
in Turkey's southeast. 
Diplomatic and political relations between Turkey and 
Germany managed to build up to a cooperative level once 
more despite the 1992 debates over use of force and the 
human rights issue vis-a-vis Turkish-Kurds. Raids on PKK camps 
and over-border operations continued unabated throughout 
the year, and 1993 witnessed a heated political campaign 
participating in the formation of a coalition government 
culminating when Tansu <;iller became Prime Minister of Turkey 
in September of that year. <;iller had made eradicating the PKK 
a major goal on the campaign trail. By October, she visited 
Germany in an effort to better state relations, and additionally, 
visited the U.S. to do the same. Apparently, although 
unconfirmed, the issue of PKK terrorism and the need for 
cooperation with Western allies to help quell its reign of terror in 
Turkey were on the Prime Minister's visit agenda. Similar efforts 
were made toward Syria, Iraq and Iran through Turkish Foreign 
Ministry delegation visits. Efforts by the new Turkish government 
were to pay off in the near term. 
The PKK staged two waves of attacks on dozens of Turkish 
diplomatic and commercial facilities in Europe in June and 
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November of 1993. The first round staged on 24 June, consisted 
of vandalism and demonstrations. PKK militants occupied the 
Turkish Consulate in Munich for one day and Kurdish 
demonstrators stormed the Turkish Embassy in Bern. Switzerland. 
On 4 November, the PKK firebombed Turkish targets, killing a 
Turkish man in Wiesbaden, Germany. After the November 
attacks, police officials in Germany swept through Kurdish 
offices and apartments, confiscating PKK-related materials. 
French police arrested more than 20 Kurds, including two 
alleged PKK leaders in France. The German Interior Minister 
banned the PKK and 35 associated organizations on 26 
November, and France banned the PKK and the Kurdistan 
Committee on 29 November 1993./38 
The storefront organizations of the PKK banned in Germany 
included the Committees of Kurdistan, Feyka, Kurdish 
Information Agency (KURD-HA). and youth, women's. cultural 
and artistic associations. Adding to other Interior Ministry 
statements in reaction to the November 4 and June 24 events, 
Minister Manfred Kanther said in a written statement; 
Germany can be no battleground for foreign 
terrorists .. .The PKK, in pursuit of its goals. puts pressure on 
Kurdish citizens to join the group, persecutes political 
opponents, and there are suspicions that it uses 
blackmail to get money for its acts of violence./39 
The violent acts of the PKK in Western Europe evoked outcry in 
political parties in Bern, Bonn, Paris. Stockholm and Zurich. In 
Germany, Federal Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel stated; 
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The reaction to the attacks by the militant Kurdish groups 
in various German cities as well as in some other 
European countries against Turkish institutions could only 
be disgust and outrage ... we can no longer accept these 
militant Kurdish groups to obtain their aims in Germany 
through violence./ 40 
The Interior Minister of Bavaria added; 
The PKK should definitely be banned in this 
country ... Bavaria's Interior Minister, Dr. Gunther Beckstein, 
is outraged at the PKK' s violence as it is being carried out 
in Germany; Beckstein reiterated his request to ban the 
PKK in the country to the Federal Interior Minister, 
Manfred Kanther. He said, "what more should happen in 
order to ban the PKK and the organizations around it? It's 
time to show that Federal Germany has resorted to the 
defense of democracy./ 41 
In the Turkish press, the European ban of PKK storefront 
operations were hailed with the newspaper headlines, "Thank 
you Mr. Kohl"/42, "Good morning Europe"/43, and "<;iller forced 
it, and Germany hit it"./44 After the windfall of Western 
European action in banning the PKK, the <;iller coalition 
government, with its partner, the Turkish Social Democrat Party, 
was quick to claim diplomatic success. Western European 
governments in response, pointed out that measures were 
taken in Germany and France to maintain internal security, and 
were not initiated solely in response to pressure from Turkey. It is 
speculated that while some of the major operative points in 
Europe were closed down, notably in Germany where 35 
storefront organizations were dismantled, the PKK was still able 
to reroute its network to other countries where PKK affiliated 
groups were not banned, particularly in Belgium, Austria and 
parts of Scandinavia. 
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On the high tide of PKK bannings in November, the January 28, 
1993 secret operation into Zaleh staged by the Turkish Armed 
Forces occured. The operation struck 110 kilometers deep into 
Northern Iraq. The strike was carried out in successive waves of 
four jets based on target reconnaissance models of PKK camps 
posted in the Zaleh region. Ankara claimed that hundreds of 
PKK militants were killed in underground hideaways. The strike 
was major, carried out in the 36th parallel region under the 
protection of coalition forces, and indicated that Turkey had a 
significant strike capability over its borders. Alternately, the PKK 
claimed that 7 PKK militants were killed, 2 Turkish jets were shot 
down during the operation, and that the Zaleh camp 
commander remained alive./45 
Relative to the Zaleh operation is the question as to how 
significant the impact of the Turkish force strike on PKK bases 
had actually been. The height of tensions over the PKK 
insurgency problem in the Turkish armed forces and in the 
public during January was particularly high. The figures upon 
which the success of the Zaleh operation may be analyzed are 
the Turkish Armed Forces estimates versus those of the PKK. The 
attack by Turkish forces was timed at a politically loaded 
period, and its effect on the Turkish scene, not dissimilar to 
earlier armed forces maneuvers, had a somewhat assuaging 
effect on the Turkish public which was informed of its 
occurrence the following day. Further discussion of the Turkish 
armed forces anti-PKK counterterrorism strikes will be 
elaborated in Chapter 3. 
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By mid-April 1994, the German Chancellor's Office and the 
Defense and Foreign Ministries announced investigations into 
allegations purporting that Ankara had broken its promise not 
to use armored tanks issued by Germany in counterterrorism 
maneuvers against the PKK in the southeast. The investigation 
prompted a suspension of arms transfers to Turkey, and brought 
to mind the earlier "embargo", similarly enforced and then lifted 
just one year before. Ministry officials in both Germany and 
Turkey were quick to assure that this in fact was not an 
embargo, but a suspension pending investigation into human 
rights claims based in Turkey's southeast. Evidence in the form 
of pictures was presented to and analyzed by Foreign Minister 
Klaus Kinkel asserted that no deployment of weapons in 
violation of NATO agreements could be proven. Arms 
shipments from Germany were resumed in the latter part of the 
first week of May 1994. 
By May 9th, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel issued a 
statement calling for improved ties with Ankara. He also 
advocated that the CSCE should send obseNers to monitor 
allegations of human rights abuses against Turkish-Kurds in 
Turkey's southeast. A statement that was issued in the German 
daily Frankfurter Rundschau, seemed aimed at the German 
public in light of the lifting of a arms shipment suspension to 
Turkey. There was a reaction in Ankara which intimated that if 
the German-issued NATO arms would be suspended off and on 
every year based on human rights allegations, Ankara would 
procure stockpile arms elsewhere. 
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Digression into the major PKK-related events affecting Turkish-
German relations paints a telling picture for the future. The two 
states' fluctuating relations indicate that they will likely continue 
to experience controversy and diplomatic entanglements over 
the situation in southeast Turkey, and particularly over human 
rights violation allegations. A discussion about the questions 
raised in this chapter and an analysis of how they portend for 
future relations between Turkey and Germany reveals the 
overarching question as to how the two states will manage to 
better communicate about the PKK threat to Turkey and 
separate it from the larger Kurdish question, which is premised 
on Turkish-Kurd cultural rights reforms. The issue of human rights 
violation allegations figures prominently in answering both 
questions. Factors greatly influencing this kind of 
communication rotates around the respective governments' 
use of armed forces, human rights and the mass media. 
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Chapter 3: German and Turkish Perspectives 
The treatment of a "perception of a threat" and an "actual 
threat" is not provisoed in the German constitution, as opposed 
to the Turkish Constitution, which stipulates in broad terms what 
does and does not define threatening behavior to the state. 
What constitutes threatening behavior (i.e. terrorist-related) 
whether it be internal. extra national, or state-sponsored, is 
interpreted differently in each country. What might constitute 
terroristic behavior or terrorism in one country may not equate 
to standards set out in another. This is to say that while 
Germany performed "looking out" activities under the provisos 
laid out by its Office for the Protection of the Constitution vis-a-
vis Kurdish activism with alleged backing from the PKK, it has 
been difficult for the government to concisely distinguish 
between Turks and Turkish Kurds. Moreover, no official 
distinction can be made between Turkish and Turkish-Kurd 
citizenship registration, differentiating one group from another. 
Germany in particular out of all European nations, would 
immediately be subject to charges of racism, had it attempted 
to step-up an anti-Kurd campaign to contain PKK terrorism. 
The fact that Germany did not respond earlier to PKK terrorism 
and affiliated organizations on German soil, despite the Turkish 
government's urgings to do so raised an important question. 
According to the Turkish case. the German government was 
aiding and abetting PPKK terrorism in a way that seemed to 
compromise its democratic tenets and not support a NATO 
member ally. The question raised for liberal Western 
democracies, such as Germany revolved around the issue as to 
whether Western democracies tolerate terrorism. This polemic is 
thoroughly analyzed by international terrorism scholar Noemi 
Gal-Or, who maintains that the combination of experience-
with-terrorism and nature-of-terrorism has resulted in a rather 
flexible threshold of tolerance of terrorism./46 Gal-Or 
summarizes Germany's stance succinctly: 
It is a matter of fact that there is a prevailing unanimity 
of ideas that lie at the basis of liberal democracy: 
delegitimization of non-governmental and non-political 
violence, along with delegitimization of violence in 
matters of domestic politics which include the absolute 
denuniciation of terrorism in this normative category 
(clearly, governmental violence has also its moral and 
ideological limits here). This is an elementary common 
denominator of all the liberal democracies discussed by 
definition of their democratic virtue./47 
A brief description of the German countersubversion efforts 
against the Red Army Faction (RAF) intimates that the 
experience-with and nature-of terrorism dynamic comes into 
play, with interesting parallels to the Turkish case with PKK 
insurgency: 
The German experience with the Red Army Faction 
(RAF) points to a combination of the unpreparedness of 
the government and surprise. The German government 
responded in a way which was as close as possible to the 
imperatives of the 'ideal' rejection of violence in liberal 
democracies' political game. German revolutionary-
ideological, left-wing terrorism also impinged on the very 
sensitive issue of the viability of the renewed German 
democracy, which was dependent upon the purity of 
the system with regard to its genuinely democratically 
oriented representatives: "In many newspaper articles the 
behavior of the sympathizers was explained by 
comparison to the Gestapo era. during which citizens 
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gave refuge to resistance fighters fleeing from the police 
pursuing them./48 
While attempting to uphold a determined democratic stance, 
Germany tries to come as close as it can to the 'ideal' of 
practicing democracy, even if not necessarily accomplishing it 
to its full satisfaction, nor the satisfaction of other states. The 
'ideal' and its ramifications for the upholding of human rights is 
a significant factor in Turkish-German state relations, and is a 
fundamental component in Germany's conception of a free 
democratic basic order. The Turkish understanding of the 
German conception however, is that double standards are 
applied on a case-by-case basis and that in relation to the 
case of assisting in fighting the PKK, more focused on a pro-
Kurdish rather than anti-terrorist premise. 
It is helpful to understand Germany's experience throughout 
the 1970s with the Baader-Meinhof terrorist group, which led to 
significant claims of "abuses" in the way the state treated the 
group's leaders in prison. In the early to mid-1970s, Germany 
experienced a wave of terrorist attacks from the Red Army 
Faction (RAF) whose founders were Andreas Baader, Ulrike 
Meinhof, and Horst Mahler. Because of their committment to a 
program of armed revolution through urban guerilla violence, 
the press came to dub them as the "Baader-Meinhof Gang". 
The group was particularly active in 1977, which has often been 
referred to as the "German Autumn". There was a great deal of 
intellectual and mainstream sympathy for the terrorists, who 
had succeeded through propaganda to defend their cause 
against capitalism and NATO effectively enough as to garner a 
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great deal of public support. Upon being jailed, the Baader-
Meinhof leaders conducted a hunger strike and appealed to 
the European Commission on Human Rights on the grounds 
that their human rights were being systematically violated in 
prison and that they were being tortured. The eventual self-
strangulation of Ulrike Meinhoff in May 1976 in her prison cell by 
hanging herself, sent a shock wave throughout Germany and 
the West. A popular claim by the RAF revolutionaries was that 
the state had "murdered" Meinhof and that the prison forces 
were responsible for her death given the fact that before 
investigating the death, the prison management announced 
her suicide. Members of the group, including, Baader, Ensslin, 
and Raspe committed suicide in thier cells in October 1977./ 49 
The German government continued to practice the right to 
interrogate and imprison terrorists as they saw fit, and justified 
the use of means to extricate information from the Baader-
Meinhof group and its sympathizers both inside and outside 
prison. Thus, while Germany is critical of the means employed 
by the Turkish security forces against the PKK, the German 
government has had its own experience with 
countersubversion. The fact remained however, that the 
Baader-Meinhof revolutionaries and the German treatment of 
them during imprisonment received wide international 
attention and criticism in the 1970s and beyond. 
Constitutional, Criminal Code and Natural Origin laws in Turkey 
are a complicated and debated subject, meriting a separate 
comprehensive study. However, since the republic's founding in 
1923, the nation has remained unitary and secular in 
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orientation. It is clear that Ankara has never deviated from its 
long-standing conviction that Turkey's future lies with a 
democratic Europe, as evidenced by its application to the 
European Community in 1987 and its commitment to a 
Customs Union effective in 1996. The Turkish multiparty system 
and elected parliament in the recovery wake of three military 
coup d'etats since 1960, prove a strong trend toward further 
democratization in the country. The lingering after effects of the 
military regime which ruled from 1980 to 1983, however, persist 
constitutionally and in the Criminal Code under a number of 
laws which according to democratic norms, curtail basic rights 
and are worded so as to enable the Turkish courts and security 
services to interpret them at their discretion. 
Some criticism by the German government toward the way the 
Turkish government exercises its Criminal Code has fueled the 
misunderstanding over the PKK, as a separate polemic from the 
Kurdish question. The inconsistencies between law and practice 
are evidenced by continued claims by Germany and other 
Western countries that there is systematic violation of human 
rights practice in southeast Turkey. It is noteworthy that most 
claims are directed toward the condition of justice in Turkey's 
southeast in relation to decisions passed by the security courts 
located there. Numerous cases have been filed at the 
European Commission of Human Rights, further intimating the 
notion that Turkey has exercised questionable judgement in the 
way it administers its state security courts, jurisdiction and the 
handling of accused parties. 
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It is significant that the Turkish constitution contains articles 
which stipulate the illegality of making separatist-oriented 
speeches, behavior or actions aimed at dividing the state, 
collaboration with separatist-oriented groups, and defaming 
the government, armed forces, or Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the 
founder of the Republic. Prohibition of cruel or inhuman 
treatment or punishment, including torture can be found in 
Turkish law of national origin and in Turkish legislation 
implementing international treaties. Article 17, paragraph 3 of 
the Constitution states that no person shall be subjected to a 
penalty or to treatment incompatible with human dignity. 
Article 17 also contains a clause that has important bearing in 
relation to countersubversion conducted by the Turkish Armed 
Forces against the PKK. Two additional provisions of the 
Criminal Code, Articles 245 and 243, punish law enforcement 
officers who ill treat or cause bodily injury, or who torture an 
accused person in order to make him/her confess to an 
offense. Article 456 of the Criminal Code prohibits battery and 
Articles 228, 240 and 25 l mete out other punishment of public 
officials for committing bodily abuse against suspects. Article 90 
paragraph 5 of the Constitution states that international 
agreements duly put into effect carry the force of law. Most 
important perhaps for international democratic standard 
comparison, is the "collective offenses" section of Article 16 of 
Law 2845 in the Criminal Code, under the jurisdiction of the 
State Security Courts, which states that the maximum length in 
police custody is 15 days. The period can be doubled to 30 
days by written order of a public prosecutor or a judge in areas 
where a state of emergency has been declared. Under martial 
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law, a 15 to 30 day detention is also stipulated/SO Turkey is 
bound by international treaties to which it is a signatory as 
stipulated in Article 15, paragraph l. As such, the detention 
period beyond 15 days is clearly violated in light of antiterrorism 
activities conducted by the Turkish government and military. 
In upholding the Turkish Constitution, the government(s) have at 
various times also modified certain provisos germane to 
political exigencies. Given the nation's experience with military 
intervention and building a sustainable democracy under 
consequent return to civilian government, the constitution has 
been revised in many ways. However, the founding principles 
of equality of peoples in Turkey has been consistently upheld. 
From this unitary practice stand point, and the threat posed to 
it by the PKK polemic, analysis of legality of operations by 
armed forces, the question of human rights and the treatment 
of the mass media is warranted. 
iii. Inter-constitutionality: The case of convicted PKK criminals in 
Gerrnany 
An interesting example of constitution interpretation came into 
play with the handing down by the High Court of Dusseldorf, 
Germany a guilty verdict for 19 PKK-affiliated criminals in April 
1994. A question arose about how to handle the prosecution. 
The German government is discussing the sensitive issue of 
extradition of the criminals to Turkey very carefully. Extradition 
may be considered only upon a Turkish request based upon a 
case before Turkish law. This request was never officially made 
by the Turkish government after the November 1993 PKK 
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events, although an unofficial request was filed. The request 
was posted unofficially because the Turkish Foreign Ministry 
anticipated that given the tenets of German and international 
law, the arrested PKK members would not likely be extradited 
to Turkey given German and international laws. 
Participating in a violent demonstration in Germany does not 
fall into this category. The second option is expulsion, based 
inter alia on a case in Germany which would not necessarily be 
punishable in Turkey; under German law the expulsion of a 
convicted criminal would shorten the prison term. The 
extradition of criminals who might face the death penalty in 
their home country is strictly prohibited by the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), to which both Turkey and 
Germany are signatories. Even though extradition may be the 
subject of review with respect to human rights conventions, 
there is still a wide margin of appreciation for state practice. 
However, the ECHR has provisions which protect the right to life, 
protection from inhuman or degrading treatment and are used 
in the European interpretation of extradition requests. The 
present German discussion regarding extradition of PKK-
affiliated criminals to Turkey centers on a second option; the 
difficulty existing that Turkey might come to expect expulsion 
for example, of a violent Kurdish demonstrator in Germany 
because Turkey might presume him guilty under Article 125 of 
the Turkish Criminal Code, regardless as to whether he had 
expressed his "separatist" opinions in Turkey or Germany. 
Therefore, the German discussion focuses upon excluding the 
expulsion option from the start, or to ask for guarantees from 
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Turkey against potential torture or death sentence in the event 
that extradition is granted. While the restrictive practice since 
1984 through the Turkish Parliament of confirming a death 
sentence remains a problem, according to Germany, so does 
the possibility of torture in Turkish custody and/or imprisonment. 
Therefore, any extradition decision will be carefully made./51 
II. Use of security force 
The discussion of use of security force in this section deals 
primarily with policies and activities as relevant to PKK terrorist 
insurgency. In the German case, the twice suspended transfer 
of arms to Turkey is explicated according to the interpretation 
of the German Ministry of Defense. Discussion beyond that issue 
is not within the confines of this study. The armed forces' 
policies and practices of Turkey with regard to PKK insurgency 
will be elaborated as a point of analysis for Turkish-German 
relations. The use of force, to whom it is applied, and how it is 
applied is a theme that runs throughout the fluctuating cycle of 
the two states' relations, and is perhaps the central issue at 
hand for Turkey's democratizing future and its relations with its 
Western allies. 
i. Germany 
The twice raised question posed by the German government 
toward Turkish Armed Forces improper use of German-issued 
arms transfers in the form of armored tanks is pivoted on the 
interpretation of the NA TO defense assistance program and the 
Military Aid Program decided on after the Gulf War. There are 
no actual guidelines for the use of NATO weapons transferred 
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from Germany to Turkey. The mutual unsigned agreement 
between the two member NATO states was that the weapons 
furnished under these programs would be used in conformity 
with Article 5 of the NATO Treaty; meaning in defense against 
external threats. Germany, despite Turkey's argument under 
Article 13 of the NATO declaration of Rome, stated that it had 
no disagreement with Turkey's right to combat terrorism, but 
did voice its apprehension about the way the struggle against 
terrorism in Turkey's southeast was conducted. The German 
argument claimed that the Turkish-Kurd rural population in the 
southeast had been affected negatively, and therefore 
interpreted Article 13 broadly. The subsequent exchange of 
letters between the foreign ministers of Germany and Turkey 
confirmed that the assistance program weapons would be 
used for external threats only. Consequently, neither during the 
first "embargo" in April 1993, nor the subsequent suspension of 
arms transfers in April 1994, provided convincing proof of use of 
German-issued BTR-60 armored personnel carriers in Turkish-
conducted anti-terrorist operations. In the Fall of 1992, it was 
decided to phase out the assistance program by the end of 
1994 due to financial difficulties posed to Germany after 
reunification./ 52 
In the brief synopsis of the purported involvement of German-
issued arms in Turkish military security activities, an injection of 
issues beyond deployment was addressed. Namely, that 
combating terrorism is recognized as a non-contentious point. 
More importantly, the issue of whom (i.e. civilian population-
wise) counterterrorism activities affect in the aims of hitting a 
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"target theater" has been raised by the German government to 
a significant degree. The fact that so many Turkish-Kurd civilians 
have been killed or adversely affected by the PKK terrorists' 
campaign has caused Germany and Turkey's other Western 
allies to express concern over who is caught in the crossfire. The 
issues of human rights abuses and the maintenance of 
international treaties to which Turkey is a signatory has received 
attention in the West. The countersubversion tactics of the 
Turkish military are not uncommon in terms of combating 
terrorism, but the fact that so many innocent civilians die in the 
process is an area for consideration. Particularly since the 
Turkish government's image toward the Turkish-Kurd civilian 
population was being adversely affected as a side-effect of 
anti-PKK operations is and will continue to be at the heart of 
the German-Turkish use of military force debate. However, the 
Turkish government and armed forces' response to concern 
over the civilian cross-fire statistics will in the long term likely be 
a secondary consideration to the eradication of PKK terror in 
the southeast. The position of the Turkish government and 
armed forces remains rooted to abolishing the PKK before 
aspects of the Kurdish question may be addressed, such as; 
Turkish-Kurd cultural, media or politcal representation. 
ii. Turkey 
The Turkish Armed Forces is highly esteemed and regarded as 
an essential component in the establishment of the Republic. It 
was a guiding power in resisting foreign occupation forces 
under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal' s nationalists. 
Accompanying the military aspect of the establishment of the 
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Turkish Republic, was the set of democratic norms which were 
inaugurated by Ataturk. The Turkish Constitution ratified in 1924 
aimed at founding and entrenching a democratic, unitary 
order that would come to define the Turkish state under the 
umbrella of Kemalist nationalism. For the sake of discussion 
here, the role assumed by the Turkish Armed Forces in the post-
1980 period is of interest. Given the framework of the Cold War 
period ending in 1989, Turkey's membership in NATO largely 
affected its role in the Middle East region, and its position as an 
anchor in Southeastern Europe. Turkey has been considered in 
NATO terms as the southeastern Europe key member state in 
the region; which includes the Black Sea, the Eastern 
Mediterranean, the Transcaucasus, Central Asia and the 
northern tier of the Middle East. Turkey's relationship with the 
West as a regional ally was confirmed in 1952 with Turkey's 
signature of the NATO Alliance Charter. 
The Turkish Armed Forces military portfolios and profiles have 
been largely based on bilateral efforts with Western allies to 
ensure a sufficient weaponry stockpile in the face of several 
threats posed to it strategically in the region. During the Cold 
War period, the orientation was primarily aimed at the potential 
Soviet threat from the north, with Iran and Iraq as the 
secondary defense consideration or tier, and a concentration 
of force in the Thracian region. The secondary and tertiary 
security considerations were viewed as "stepchildren" however, 
in light of the menacing and powerful threat emanating from 
the positioning of forces throughout the Soviet Union's republic 
outposts. The northern threat to Turkey from Russia existed for 
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hundreds of years, and grew in dimension when the Cold War 
escalated tensions to a new height and changed regional 
perameters significantly. The "Russian threat• to Turkey continues 
to be a concern in defense policy formulation today, despite 
the end of the Cold War, given Turkey's regional position and 
the waterways and trade routes that exist on the European and 
Asian continents. 
When the specter of insurgency in the incipient and latent form 
of the PKK came into being, the Turkish armed forces 
orientation toward being prepared for the Russian threat 
explained the ill-equipped stature of the armed forces to 
conduct over-border operations in Turkey's southeast, or to be 
able to anticipate the strength the PKK would amass over the 
five year period of 1981 to 1986. The Turkish armed forces were 
not equipped for a threat beyond their three-pronged 
traditional strategy. The porous nature of the border and the 
fact that Turkey did not have the appropriate helipcopters, 
armored vehicle carriers or night vision equipment in the 
southeast led Turkey to begin the fight against the PKK from a 
position of weakness which was disproportionate to the stature 
of the Turkish state. 
The cycle of violence perpetuated in Turkey's southeast left 
Ankara and the armed forces with the "guesstimation· work of 
trying to speculate actual PKK force presence in the region. 
The insurgents had not yet "publicized" their name, function or 
purpose. Such an unknown quantity in the early 1980s was 
worse than a named threatening power; it was a "being· that 
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could not yet be qualified. Thus, the threat geared to the north 
of Turkey precluded a focus, or even appropriation of the 
necessary arms and force strength to wage a retaliatory 
campaign against unknown "bandits• in Turkey's southeast. 
What in fact favored the incipient PKK movement during the 
early stages, was the Turkish armed forces' lack of air mobility 
and night vision equipment. The mountainous terrain, replete 
with rocky caverns, hidden caves and treacherous cliffs, was 
diametrically opposed to the setting of the longstanding 
conventional threat posed from the north. The latent form of 
PKK terrorist insurgency would come to represent an 
unconventional threat with outside funding and bases, and 
would mandate a critical shift of focus to surmount the 
burgeoning growth of the terrorist organization in the country's 
southeast. 
The Turkish armed forces enlisted bilateral cooperation through 
NATO in upping its ante of air attack mobility forces and night 
vision equipment over time. Budget appropriations after 6zal's 
death and during the present government focused a 
significant portion of Turkey's national budget on military 
appropriations in the campaign to eradicate PKK insurgency. 
The present government claims that as much as $6 billion a 
year is being allocated for the fight against the PKK. If the force 
strength of the PKK is truly in the range of 5 ,000, the implications 
for expenditures to "eliminate' each individual terrorist are 
substantial, and call into question how effectively the 
countersubversion campaign against the PKK is being waged 
by Turkish Armed Forces. 
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As the democratic and elected multiparty system assumed a 
pivotal role in Turkish politics, the Turkish Armed Forces was put 
on second order as a leading influence in determining the 
country's affairs. However, the armed forces were never far 
from the scene of any decision-making event, and served as a 
bolstering presence of upholding order and democracy in the 
country. It is the armed forces' mandate to maintain stability in 
the country, and their interdiction into civilian political debate 
intimates a strong hold and position in the system. Due to the 
fact that the armed forces had the power to intervene through 
three military coup d'etat in the past indicates that the 
leverage afforded to them in terms of a reputation of having 
"bailed out the country" from civil anarchy is significant, and a 
factor to be considered in analyzing the Turkish political system. 
The Ankara governments from 1980 onward relied on the strong 
backbone provided by the armed forces in the fight against a 
growing PKK insurgency problem. Through the declaration of a 
State of Emergency in nine southeastern provinces in 1989, the 
Turkish armed forces were able to declare martial law in 
contentious areas of state security in retaliation to the over the 
border, hit-and-run insurgency tactics of the PKK. 
To facilitate the capture, detention, and interrogation of 
suspected PKK terrorists, the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 
1982 passed a Criminal Code with anti-terrorism laws legally 
allowing for interpretation in the determination of terrorist 
suspects and terrorism-related crimes. Acts of speech or 
suspected affiliation with a terrorist organization, behavior of a 
separatist nature, and intent to destabilize the unitary nature of 
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the Turkish state were provisoed as contributory behavior for 
prosecution under the Crimal Code's anti-terrorism laws. Under 
criticism from the West for violating democratic tenets through 
its Criminal Code and anti-terrorism laws, the Turkish coalition 
governments of Demi rel and Inonu, and \:iller and Karayal91n 
sought a revision of legislation that violated basic rights. 
However, no such legislation has been passed due to lack of 
political agreement over reforms in the Criminal Code between 
the True Path Party and the Social Democratic Party. The 
problem remains that there is a real threat posed by the PKK in 
the southeast of Turkey; a threat that Western governments do 
not face. This threat provides Turkey with the justification to 
combat terrorism with any means it sees fit. This stance has 
prompted criticism by the West because the PKK insurgency 
campaign necessarily overlaps with the human rights violation 
polemic because of the impact on the Turkish-Kurd civilian 
population in the southeast, as well as the violation of 
international treaties to which Turkey is a signatory. However, a 
proactive stance on modifying anti-terrorism behavior and 
practices in Turkey has not been concluded. Such reforms 
appear to have been nearly dropped off the politcal and 
judicial agendas. Basic rights violations contained in the 
Criminal Code allow for abuse in the system and fuel 
accusations by the West that Turkey is doing little to address 
and work to reform practices that violate international law. 
A new anti-terrorism draft bill that was reviewed but not ratified 
in November 1993, aimed to modify provisos affecting human 
rights of detainees in the southeast PKK theater of conflict as 
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well as those individuals who are suspected of perpetrating 
crimes for a terrorist organization although they might not be a 
member. The November 1993 proposed anti-terrorism bill 
contained strict measures to deter terrorism. One clause 
included prison sentences of 2 to 5 years for terrorist or terrorist 
sympathizers participating in rallies, meetings or 
demonstrations, or who spread verbal or written propaganda 
advocating the secular and/or territorial integrity of the Turkish 
Republic. A noteworthy clause stipulated that the security 
police have the right to detain terrorist suspects from 2 weeks to 
30 days without the presence of a lawyer during interrogations. 
Although the proposed November 1993 anti-terrorism bill 
advocated a reduction of the number of original sentences 
handed down to members (or suspected members) of terrorist 
organizations by nine-tenths, the leeway of interpretation 
afforded to the armed forces, security, police and security high 
courts remained substantial./53 
The anti-terrorism bill of 1993 could not pass in the Grand 
National Assembly because there was political opposition to 
many of the provisos contained within the proposal. The 
Criminal Code remains in its 1982 form and will likely not be 
altered in light of the PKK' s recent escalation of violence in the 
southeast. Armed forces-initiated operations continue within 
Turkey and over the border into Northern Iraq is proof that 
adaptation to the unconventional PKK threat has occurred. The 
exercise of broadly interpreted methods of capture, detention 
and interrogation however, has ramifications for the Turkish 
government and armed forces, particularly because they are 
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the criteria on which Germany and Turkey's Western allies have 
staked their allegations of the systematic abuse of human rights 
in southeast Turkey. 
Il. Human rights 
i. Gennany 
The Government of Germany increasingly expressed concern 
about the methods employed by Turkish security forces 
combating PKK terrorism in Turkey's southeast throughout the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. The concern is based on the alleged 
systematic violation of human and civil rights of rural Turkish-
Kurds dwelling in the region. In addition to the armed forces' 
treatment toward suspected or affiliated terrorist elements and 
their methods of detention and interrogation have been 
criticized in Germany ans by Turkey's Western allies. 
It is argued by a former U.S. Ambassador to Ankara, Morton 
Abramowitz, that NATO receded in importance during the post 
Cold War era. Turkey's political relations with Europe, 
particularly Germany, have not prospered because of its 
human rights record and the "low-intensity war" being 
conducted against the PKK./54 The international conventions 
to which Turkey is party, the European Convention on Human 
Rights (1950) and the UN Convention Against Torture (1984), in 
addition to memberships in the CSCE, Council of Europe, NATO 
and the UN are provisoed as legally binding under the Turkish 
Constitution (Article 90, paragraph 5). However, there exists a 
contradiction between word and deed. The German 
government, in addition to other European governments and 
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the United States, has forged allegations against Ankara in 
relation to human rights abuses by Turkish security and police 
forces regarding counterterrorism activities conducted against 
the PKK organization. 
In this work, in order to present a more international front vis-a-
vis human rights allegations, the German governments' claims 
will be incorporated into a larger body of allegations from 
European agencies and organizations. While allegations that 
systematic torture is practiced in southeast Turkey are routinely 
denied by Ankara, promises are nonetheless made by top level 
Turkish officials to improve Turkey's international standing 
through a better human rights record. This was evident as 
witnessed by Prime Minister <;iller' s October 1993 visits to 
Germany and the U.S. The allegations by Western governments 
maintain that human rights abuses by Turkish security forces 
increased in 1993./55 Among the cited abuses are deaths of 
persons under suspicious circumstances (while in custody), 
extrajudicial killings during raids on safe houses, and retaliations 
for PKK attacks on villages and towns resulting in the killing of 
civilians and the destroying of property and livestock. There are 
also purported mystery killings, harassment, and intimidation of 
prominent members of the Kurdish community in the southeast. 
The U.S. State Department in 1993 also alleged that "In most 
cases, the government failed to initiate any public inquiry or to 
press charges in connection with these murders.· /56 However, 
analysis in the Turkish press has indicated that investigations 
yielded the arrests of political and religious rival factions in 
relation to these murders. Regardless, many politically-
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motivated crimes go unsolved for extensive periods of time in 
Turkey. 
In December 1992, the Council of Europe Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture issued a report on the systematic use of 
torture in Turkey by police forces. The Committee made three 
visits to Turkish police custody facilities and prisons in the Anti-
T error Departments of Ankara and Diyarbakir. Allegations were 
made by persons suspected or convicted of offenses under the 
anti-terrorism law provisions. Forms of torture cited were 
suspension by the arms during interrogation, electric shocks to 
sensitive parts of the body, including genitals, beating of the 
soles of the feet, hosing with pressurized cold water, and 
incarceration in dark, unventilated cells./57 
The Helsinki Watch Human Rights Commission issued a 
statement in 1992 alleging that 21 prisoners had died from 
torture. Methods used against prisoners were ascertained after 
medical examination, and included hanging naked victims by 
arms tied behind their backs, electric shock to the genitals, 
vaginal and anal rape, beating and pulling out of hair or 
fingernails./ 58 
Such reports are but a few among a larger literature. The 
German government has based its judgement on its own 
agency investigations, which include work on the issue by the 
Green Party, Amnesty International and other human rights 
advocacy groups. The human rights problem has greatly 
exacerbated the progress of German-Turkish relations, and is 
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the pillar around which sensitive political decisions are made. 
The human rights issue is often highlighted to a degree in the 
West that it fails to differentiate that problem from the PKK 
polemic. This mixing of the two problems serves to escalate the 
larger Kurdish question in Turkey, and creates the image that 
Turkey is a police state, rather than a parliamentary democracy 
fighting a formidable terrorist insurgency. The German public is 
highly sensitized through the government and media about the 
cause of human rights. One such example supporting this claim 
was evidenced in the reaction to German rightist extremist 
murders of 3 Turks in Solingen, Germany in May 1993. Thousands 
of Germans took to the street to protest the racist act. 
It could be speculated that the Americans, British and French 
have "taken up the flag· for Northern Iraqi Kurds, as displayed in 
their joint efforts during and after the Gulf War. It may be 
similarly conjectured that the Germans have taken up the 
cause of human rights as they affect the Turkish-Kurds in the 
southeast predicament posed by the PKK in Turkey. The Turkish 
contention maintains that the West and Germany in particular 
have used double standards toward criticizing Turkey for its 
human rights record. The Turkish view contends that the West 
has supported less democratic countries than Turkey in the 
past, notably in the Middle East. The Turks contend that the 
human rights issue as promulgated in the Western media 
overshadows the PKK terror problem and focuses more 
exclusively on Turkish-Kurd allegations of Turkish "state terror·. 
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Normatively, it would seem that human rights maintenance 
should not be used as a political tool -- but albeit indirectly. The 
upholding of human rights is used a a tool for change, which is 
critical vis-a-vis Western relations as Turkey continues to 
democratize. Turkey as a Western ally has come to be 
expected to apply democratic norms and implement 
international practice regarding human rights, despite the 
insurgency threat it is faced with by the PKK. Systematically, so 
much in the Turkish political framework has been handled 
militarily. The fight against the PKK necessarily falls into the 
military counterinsurgency domain, but the larger Kurdish 
question should not. The PKK polemic is a separate entity from 
that of the Kurdish question. The Kurdish question is largely 
political, with tremendous future implications for Turkey. 
However, the understanding that both the PKK problem and 
the Kurdish question are being handled militarily in Turkey is a 
common misconception in Europe and the U.S. The lack of 
differentiation of the two polemics only contributes to the PKK' s 
success in perpetuating the myth in Europe and elsewhere that 
it is truly representative of reforms for Turkish-Kurds rather than 
an insurgent movement determined to destabilize the Turkish 
republic. Nor should the misconception that the Kurdish 
question is completely premised on ethnic repression, and that 
the PKK is addressing wrongs committed to Turkish-Kurds in 
southeast Turkey. The human rights issue has been used to good 
effect by the PKK, thereby promoting the idea that the Turkish-
Kurds are fighting some kind of cultural war, rather than an 
ideological or territorial one against the Turkish state. The Turkish 
government's position seems to be a "no win" proposition: it 
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must counter the threat posed by the PKK and yet uphold 
justice in the midst of the fray, particularly according to Western 
norms and international conventions. 
The mixing of the PKK polemic with that of the larger Kurdish 
question in the West persists in hindering Turkey's progress on 
either issue, and confounds its relations with allies. However, as 
the present Turkish government has not effectively portrayed 
itself as willing to more directly address the debate on the 
Kurdish question, and fend off allegations of human rights 
abuses beyond denying that they occur, continued criticism in 
words and perhaps actions will likely be levied at Turkey. The 
continued image in Germany, throughout Europe and the U.S. 
that abuses occur against Turkish-Kurd civilians in the combat 
zone between the Turkish Armed Forces and the PKK is further 
made worse by allegations of abuses against Turkish-Kurds 
outside the war region. 
The activities of armed forces in Turkey combined with 
allegations of systematic violation of basic human rights will 
continue to be a cause for alarm with Germany and other 
Western countries in its relations with Turkey. The Turkish-Kurd 
predicament as encapsulated in the larger Kurdish question in 
Turkey has cultural overtones, and is being portrayed as such in 
much of the current German media. Analogies to the effect 
that the Turkish state poses a tangential threat to Turkish-Kurds 
compared to that of the Serbs against the Bosnians has been 
widely published. The misunderstanding of the Turkish state's 
role in its duty to combat PKK terrorism has been obfuscated by 
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a cultural maintenance argument, which however valid, does 
not require that Turkey change its borders to allow for the 
formation of a "Kurdistan·. It seems that if human rights and 
cultural preservation are political criteria to meet Germany's 
and the allied countries' norms -- particularly when extending 
military and economic aid -- then there should be a set of 
standards applied across the board indicating the magnitude 
of their significance. However, given the number of 
conventions that exist prohibiting the violation of human rights, 
it would seem implicit that a NATO member would comply 
without necessarily being requested to do so. Failing such a 
standardization of how human rights maintenance works in 
tandem with aid and assistance grants (not in all probability 
likely to evolve from the West), Turkey will continue to have its 
democratization progress indexed by the Allies along the vein 
of maintaining a more reputable human rights record. 
Human rights is not just a basic rights problem in Turkey; it is a 
political one. It is but one component in the Turkish-Kurd, PKK 
and anti-terrorism triangular puzzle. Prime Minister Demirel 
issued statements in 1991 and 1992 concerning ceasing torture 
in Turkey. Prime Minister <;iller did the same in 1993 and 1994. 
However, the record for human rights abuses in Turkey is on 
record as worsening, as cited in the 1993 Report on Human 
Rights issued by the U.S. State Department and by several 
international human rights agencies; among them Helsinki 
Watch, Amnesty International, and the European Commission 
Committee Against Torture and Inhuman Treatment. 
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According to the Turkish Human Rights Association (IHD) in its 
1993 report; 
... 874 villages and townships were forcefully evacuated by 
security forces in the southeast of Turkey. Some of the 
southeastern villages were burned in countersubversion 
campaigns by the Turkish armed forces and relocation was and 
continues to be a common practice. Secretary General Husnu 
Ondul, head of the IHD stated, "democratization in Turkey has 
not yet been achieved. .. the institutionalization at the 
government level or its legal framework is based on anti-
democratic laws and regulation./59 
ii. Turkey 
Concomitant change on the issue of human rights violations 
accusations and how it has been comingled with the 
treatment of Turkish-Kurds civilians, the PKK polemic and the 
Kurdish question has been in a state of suspense in Turkey for 
the past four years. Plans for granting cultural rights to Turkish-
Kurds in terms of Kurdish medium education and media, and 
cultural rights beyond those they already enjoy as Turkish 
citizens has been placed on, and taken off. the political 
agenda. but has more recently been side tracked given the 
escalating bloodbath imposed by PKK insurrection. Despite the 
reduced attention to the various dimensions of the PKK threat 
and the Kurdish question in Turkey, Western allied pressure on 
Turkey to improve its position on human rights and 
democratization continues unabated. 
It is commonly feared that the unitary nature of the Turkish state 
would be threatened by premature reforms and would 
contribute to the sentiment that if Turkish-Kurds were granted 
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early cultural-political concessions that it would neccessarily 
lend to the strength of the PKK, and in the process promote 
separatist tendencies among Turkish-Kurds. As argued by the 
British scholar Philip Robins, the Turkish view seemed to intimate 
that; "cultural rights for Turkish-Kurds leading to political rights 
would inexorably lead to demands for political rights, which 
would then lead to federation, statehood and eventually union 
with adjacent Kurdish lands.· /60 
It should not be assumed that the Kurdish question will be 
answered or solved any time in the near future. Turkey is justified 
in preserving its unity in the fight against PKK insurgency, all 
modern states would do the same to preserve sovereignty. 
However, the drain occurring in Turkey over waging a low 
intensity war in its southeast and a "war of words" with its 
Western Allies in defense of current military, political, and 
human rights practices is also draining on a different level. 
Striking a balance between maintaining the unitary nature of 
the Turkish state through continued maneuvers against the PKK, 
while conceding to some modifications toward cultural 
recognition will be the course Turkey will likely follow in relation 
to its Turkish-Kurd constituents. According to former French 
Ambassador to Turkey Eric Rouleau, the Kurdish problem in 
Turkey; 
increasingly dominates domestic politics ... it undermines 
the credibility and stability of the government. It poisons 
the traditionally harmonious relations between Turkey's 
two main ethnic groups, and in the long run could even 
threaten the country's cohesion./61 
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Turkey finds itself thus as a model in the Middle East for its 
human rights record, but primitive, judged by the standards set 
forth in Europe and the U.S., the nation's Western allies. By 
signing several international human rights conventions, such as 
the European Convention on Human Rights and the UN 
Convention Against Torture, Turkey has at least nominally 
accepted Western human rights standards. The human rights 
solution and major progress on the Kurdish question in Turkey lies 
in the reform of the current Criminal Code and security force 
behavior. When such reforms can be achieved, especially in 
the face of PKK terrorism in the southeast remains questionable. 
The unpleasant tactics employed by many governments in 
counteracting terrorism are also being used in Turkey, but so 
long as the PKK continues to escalate the cycle of violence, 
armed forces countersubversion tactics such as burning 
villages, relocating villagers, and prolonged interrogation and 
custody periods will likely be practiced. According to Middle 
East specialist Graham Fuller of the RAND Corporation; 
given the rising violence in Turkey's Kurdish zone, harsh 
Turkish army operations against the local population are 
rapidly alienating the broader population in what 
sometimes resembles an intifada-like environment ... Force 
and repression clearly cannot be Ankara's sole response 
to its Kurds' political aspirations -- which are not 
exclusively separatist. Those aspirations must be met by 
political means within a democratic and pluralistic 
framework that already exists in other areas of Turkish 
political life ... Only a moderate but credible alternative 
Kurdish political movement in Turkey will eventually be 
able to supplant present sympathy among many Kurds 
for the violent and radical PKK. Unfortunately, Turkish 
government and society have not yet reached this stage 
of acceptance of the Kurdish reality, but may rapidly be 
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forced to do so, in the face of even more unpalatable 
alternatives./62 
Fuller's comments clearly advocate a political settlement 
whereby Turkey would concede to its Turkish-Kurd population, 
particularly toward approving an alternative political "voice" as 
opposed to the current "representation" by the PKK terrorist 
organization. However, Fuller's statements assume that the PKK 
is currently the representative political force of Turkish-Kurds. 
According to the Turkish view, this is a misconception. However, 
political representation by pro-Kurdish deputies in the Grand 
National Assembly in Turkey is already a reality, although the 
pro-Kurdish party DEP was dissolved in March 1994. The reality 
of a practicing pro-Kurdish party in Turkey without PKK affiliation 
or infilitration is not. The intifada-like environment that Fuller 
refers to implies that the Turkish Armed Forces under their 
government's mandate are somehow "occupying" the 
southeast, thereby alienating the Turkish-Kurd population 
residing there into potentially switching-over their alliance to 
the PKK. This is misleading. The government is granted the duty 
of preserving order and unity in Turkey. Moreover, the 
implication that the southeast of Turkey should be embraced as 
a part of a larger "Kurdistan" is unacceptable in the Turkish view. 
The struggle to maintain Turkish sovereignty will continue, and 
no political settlement will likely be made toward any kind of 
Kurdish-Turkish federation within Turkey's borders. Some cultural 
concessions, perhaps accompanying educational and media 
reforms for Turkish-Kurds might be made in the future under a 
representative party composed of Kurds and Turks, but will not 
likely reflect the "political movement" advocated by Fuller. 
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On May 20, 1994, it was reported that the U.S. Appropriations 
Committee of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and 
Related Programs subcommitee of Congress, proposed that 
25% of American direct loans to Turkey be withheld due to 
allegations of reported abuses against civilians in the southeast 
by the Turkish armed forces. The committee also 
recommended that the U.S. European allies should work 
together to bilaterally ensure that the abolition of the practice 
of torture in Turkey be achieved. (The proposal by the 
subcommittee has not gone to a vote.) In reaction to the U.S. 
Congressional committee's statements, the Turkish Ambassador 
to Washington, Nuzhet Kandemir, denied all allegations of 
torture in Turkey, and reiterated that; "I can tell you that we are 
winning this struggle against PKK terrorism ... within three to five 
months time, the PKK will be destroyed by the ongoing 
operations of Turkish security forces."/63 
Whether the Turkish government deems it fit to initiate cultural 
rights for Turkish-Kurds in addressing the Kurdish question in spite 
of PKK terrorism should not be the only factor in curbing human 
rights abuses in Turkey's southeast. Nor should the granting of 
cultural rights necessarily be used as a tool to contain the 
potential spread of PKK terrorism into further recesses of Turkey. 
Criminal code reform in Turkey is a major institutional means to 
help assuage Western criticism and abide by international 
norms. Statutes exist in the Turkish Criminal code regarding 
punishment of public officials committing bodily harm that are 
clearly violated on a regular basis. These statutes are common 
to the laws and constitutions of all Western countries, ultimately 
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intimating that there is a need for them to be there. However, 
the fact that they exist on paper is meaningless if they are not 
enforced on a consistent basis, as relevant to the Turkish case in 
the fight against the PKK. 
When it is politically expedient, reform will likely occur in the 
Turkish system. As long as the heightened rhetoric by the 
government, press and public continues to accept the current 
policy of wiping out PKK terrorism through any means, such 
reform will not be realized. To bring the issue of Kurdish cultural 
rights to a more mainstream level toward maintaining a 
dialogue for a sustained period of time -- would be progress. 
The denial of a problem the magnitude of that posed by the 
PKK and the Kurdish question in regard to human rights 
implications causes the dilemma posed to Turkey to fester. 
Perhaps it is contradictory to state that not until PKK terrorism is 
eradicated in Turkey will a debate ensue concerning the 
granting of cultural reforms and rights to Turkish-Kurds in terms of 
educational and media language use and firm political 
representative parties berid of the PKK-infiltrated stigma. The 
point however, is that discussion should progress over the 
continuing Kurdish question as a separate issue meriting focus 
apart from the PKK polemic. 
Despite progress on both the PKK threat and the Kurdish 
question, it is probable that Turkey could find itself with the 
predicament faced by the United Kingdom over the IRA, or the 
long-term terrorism experienced by Spain with the ETA, which 
ultimately resulted in the political-economic settlement 
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package known as the Basque Model. The Turkish government 
was taken by surprise by the rise of the PKK, and was equally 
surprised at the West's reaction to its counterterrorism 
campaign against it. Turkish civilians, military personnel, officials, 
schools, and state facilities are all violated by PKK terrorism the 
government argues; do not their violated rights and the 
defense of them count for something? In reality they do, and 
that basic fact is recognized by Western governments. 
However, the Turkish government should be held accountable 
to higher standards than those of the PKK and their terrorist 
tactics. The fight against terrorist insurgency is unequivocally 
justified, but the means through which innocent civilians suffer 
or are killed along the path toward eradication of PKK terror is 
not. However, it seems likely that thousands of civilians will 
continue to be caught in the crossfire as the Turkish armed 
forces' struggle against the PKK, ensues. 
IV. Media in Gennany and Turkey 
Essential in the compendium of factors which comprise Turkey's 
dilemma with the PKK and the Kurdish question, is the mass 
media. This section will discuss the German and Turkish press 
responses to PKK terror, and the implications they pose for the 
two governments. While it should be noted that relations on a 
governmental level are completely distinct from exchanges 
and ideas posed by the media, the effect on world public 
opinion is nonetheless impacted by the press. The PKK polemic 
versus that of the larger Kurdish question as posited in the 
German and Turkish media is a perfect case in point. The press 
is utilized in state systems as a means of explicating 
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governmental policies and actions, and dialectically impacts 
on domestic and foreign political workings. A separate work on 
the media and the dichotomy its affords for molding public 
opinion to evoke Western governmental response and change 
regarding the PKK terror organization and its distinction from 
the larger Kurdish question in Turkey is beyond the scope of this 
study. Here, a brief discussion of German and Turkish respective 
handling of the PKK case versus that of the Kurdish question, 
examines how rhetoric has been heightened through the 
media. 
As the specter of PKK activities came to the fore in southeast 
Turkey, the German press post-1986 began its coverage of the 
organization and Ankara's anti-terrorism campaign against it. 
Having somewhat incorporated the PKK terrorist campaign into 
the larger Kurdish question and criticism regarding Turkish-Kurd 
"minority repression" imposed by the Turkish state, the German 
press initiated a trend that would be nearly impossible to 
reverse. The linkage of the PKK polemic and the Kurdish 
question by the German press was perhaps enhanced once 
the onslaught of Northern Iraqi Kurds arrived in Turkey, having 
been encouraged by Western powers to try to form an 
autonomous enclave and revolt against Saddam Huseyn in 
Northern Iraq, and then the failure of that effort resulting in the 
formation of a protected safe haven under a UN mandate. 
Although Turkey accepted hundreds of thousands of refugees 
and helped to form a protective safehaven whereby Iraqi 
Kurds could be secure from prosecution, the orientation of the 
press tended to focus on the abusive tactics the Turkish armed 
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forces was using through over-the-border raids into Northern 
Iraq to eradicate armed PKK camps and their insurgents based 
there. The safehaven created by the Western allies was 
controversial in Turkey in that it allegedly aided and abetted 
the cause of PKK terror by protecting Kurds, some of whom 
were claimed to be PKK sympathizers. 
The rise of PKK-sponsored storefront organizations in Germany 
(banned in November 1993) only fueled the belief that Kurdish 
minority problems and ethnic repression under the umbrella of 
the Kurdish question were the real issues at hand, as 
represented by PKK propaganda in the form of written claims, 
demonstrations, rallies and personal testimonials by Kurds of 
various national origin dwelling in Germany. The fact that such 
information and demonstrations were legal in Germany, and 
not legal in Turkey also received wide press attention. As 
mentioned earlier, Germany would be suspected of racism if it 
too actively attempted to investigatively pursue PKK-related 
activity provided to it through intelligence sources, due to its 
inability to distinguish accurately between Kurds and Turks 
given their identical citizenship. However, this explanation for 
German hesitancy to deal PKK terrorists and supporters a firmer 
hand is complicated by the fact that there are also non-Kurds 
who are sympathetic to the PKK cause. Therefore, the "racism 
argument" fails to explain German inaction on the PKK terror 
problem prior to Novermber 1993. It is similarly argued that, 
Articles 5 and 9 of the Basic Law of Germany allow for freedom 
of expression and freedom of association, and would prohibit 
prosecution of "Kurds" or pro-Kurdish media, cultural, and 
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educational organizations, although they were acting as 
storefronts for the PKK terrorist organization. It was only when 
there was an acknowleged direct threat to internal German 
security that the organizations were banned and their affiliation 
with the PKK disclosed. Arguably, an internal threat existed 
during the past decade in Germany due to PKK terrorist and 
sympathizer use of German territory and media to promote 
their cause through demonstrations, drug and weapons 
smuggling. 
The German press contributed to heightening tensions through 
claims of alleged systematic human rights violations by Turkish 
Armed Forces against Turkish-Kurd civilians in the PKK 
operational zone of the southeast, accusations of torture by 
and against the same, the shortcomings of cultural rights for 
Turkish-Kurds under the broad scope of the Kurdish question, the 
shortcomings of democracy in Turkey, and improper use of 
German-issued transfer weapons in Turkey's southeast. The 
references are too numerous to provide in detail, but the point 
remains that a tone was set such that the threat posed to 
Turkey's sovereignty by the PKK took a back seat to the more 
driving issue of the Kurdish question. Additionally, the mixture of 
the PKK polemic with the larger Kurdish question confounded 
the German public's understanding of the reality of Turkey's 
position as posed by the PKK threat. 
The predicament of Kurds in Turkey and North Iraq became a 
focal point in the German press as the Western powers and 
Turkey continued to facilitate Operation Provide Comfort. 
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Because the Kurdish question also includes countries outside 
Turkey, the problematic appeared all the greater. The threat to 
Turkey from the PKK was viewed in Germany as a second 
consideration to the Kurdish question in terms of allegations of 
cultural repression and human rights violations against Turkish-
Kurd civilians. It is arguable as to which factors allowed for the 
linkage of the PKK polemic and the Kurdish question in the 
German media. In relation to German politics. consensus on 
the Kurdish problem reached heights, somewhat significant in 
German Lander elections, vis-a-vis public opinion. Economic 
factors determinedly effect the tone, as Germany is Turkey's 
largest trading partner in Europe. The presence of 2 million Turks 
as guestworkers in Germany contributes to the tone, as does a 
changing dynamic within Germany itself. The Turkish 
government perspective that the 2 million Turkish workers in 
Germany are greatly contributing to the German economy, 
and that Turkey is experiencing a period of economic, political 
and territorial crisis, sets the stage for the converse reality of 
how the Turkish-German relationship is evolving. The 
perspectives of each country toward the other are predicated 
on extreme poles. In the Turkish case, the German government 
focuses on Turkey's human rights record as the primary index to 
assess the PKK polemic and the larger Kurdish question. In the 
German case, the Turkish government has opted to focus on 
the extreme of racism and xenophobia against foreigners, 
including Turks, and how that impacts on relations between 
Germany and Turkey. 
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Additionally, a much larger dynamic exists due to the 
reunification of Germany, and the consequent role that 
Germany will assume in the coming era. Germany will most 
certainly be powerful in the sense of its position in Europe and 
the Western alliance system. However, according to two 
German scholars, Thomas Kielinger and Max Otte; 
Germany is strained to the breaking point by the tasks 
requested of it: rebuilding eastern Germany, assisting the 
former Soviet republics and Eastern Europe, promoting 
the European Community (now the European Union), 
and redefining its own security role. Germany's new 
assertiveness is not a result of internal strength but rather 
of growing weakness. If current pressures from outside 
Germany persist, the result might well be German 
overstretch and a domestic backlash./64 
Germany's aspirations to fully integrate the European Union 
and take a leadership position within it allow for its stance 
toward mandating conditions which meet European norms. 
Turkey, according to those norms is expected as an ally to 
meet those conditions. While the U.S. and Turkey have a 
"special relationship' through NATO and joint commercial 
endeavors, so too does Germany wish to define its own 
distinctive role with states such as Turkey. In this way, a parallel 
may be drawn as to why and how the PKK polemic and the 
Kurdish question in their many manifestations have in a sense 
become "personalized" through the German press and public. 
The Kurdish question and its linkage to the PKK polemic, with 
implications for human rights violations, have because a highly 
publicized issue in Germany, much to the incomprehension of 
the Turkish military and government. Consequently, the Turkish 
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government and military have found the German position 
difficult to counter, without incurring further criticism. 
With the second suspension of arms shipments by the German 
Defense Ministry to Turkey in April 1994, the German press 
reacted strongly to Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel's lifting of the 
ban, who stated that there was no evidence of the use of 
German-issued armored carrier vehicles against PKK operatives 
in Turkey's southeast. Accusations came in the form of baiting 
Mr. Kinkel with questions such as, "how can you support the 
terror state on the Bosphorus through resuming arms 
shipments?" /65 
The German press has injected into the PKK polemic and the 
Kurdish question an overly harsh critique of the Turkish 
government's failings, according to the Turkish perspective. This 
led as a result to concentrated treatment in the Turkish press of 
the issue of xenophobia in Germany. However, treatment on 
the issue has been substantial in both the German and Turkish 
press. The xenophobic trend, reaching its height in the August 
1992 Restock rightist anti-foreigner riots, took Germany's 
conscience by storm. Speculation in explanation of the 
Restock, Solingen and M611n rightist attack events affecting 
foreigners, among them Turks, ranged from a Der Spiegel cover 
story called "The new division: Germans against Germans·, 
which contended that a deep depression in the East and 
aloofness in the West have replaced the joy about unity and 
created a ·mental division"; to commentary by Gunter Grass, 
who posed the question: "is the inveterate foreignness that 
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exists between Germans the source of the present hostility 
toward foreigners (whom we call "outlanders") that is covering 
our country with shame?'/66 
Germany is faced with economic problems, an effort to 
redefine its role in Europe and the world, the alienation of 
Westerners and Easterners within its own borders, and a 
growing xenophobic movement. And yet, the German press in 
spite of these factors is generally self-critical about the 
country's and the government's problems. The tendency 
toward conservatism in the government and public however, 
generally contrasts with the liberal sentiments expressed on the 
waning left from such intellectuals as Grass. 
Coverage in Germany on the PKK issue and its linkage to the 
Kurdish question evolved in the mid- 1980s into a progressively 
better understanding by the mid-1990s of the terrorist threat 
posed to Turkey. This evolution in understanding at the 
government level has largely been due to exchanges at the 
Foreign Ministry of each country. The heightened rhetoric 
period has been modified with the stance of recognizing and 
banning PKK terror as it appeared in Germany and throughout 
Europe in the November 1993 PKK raids. The cause of human 
and cultural rights of Turkish-Kurd civilians in Turkey's southeast 
continues to be of mainstream interest in the German press and 
public, and receives continued analogous comparison to other 
wars premised on ethnic strife. 
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The Turkish media is an interesting case study, and while it is a 
free press, throughout the 1960-1985 period it was restricted by 
a series of military coup d'etat regulations. As explicated in this 
study, a number of statutes in the Criminal Code serve to 
restrict written and spoken ideas as they are interpreted by the 
Turkish State Security Courts. However, the major Turkish dailies, 
including Cumhuriyef, Hurriyef, Mil/iyef, the Turkish Daily News 
(TDN), and Sabah reveals an operating free expression of ideas 
and critique of the government's policies and activities. As 
mentioned in the armed forces section of this chapter, the 
Turkish military is highly regarded not only for its behind-the-
scenes role in Turkish politics, but also as the body empowered 
to combat the PKK insurgency campaign. A primary concern 
alluded to in Chapter 2 is the way information is passed from 
the Turkish Armed Forces command to the press. Given the 
nature of low intensity warfare being conducted by the PKK 
and the sensitive counterterrorism activities used to combat the 
insurgency by the armed forces, journalists are not present 
during raids and therefore must rely on the data released by 
the armed forces. The semi-effective ban on the press by the 
PKK in the southeast on October 16, 1993 only compounded 
the source-of-information dilemma. The PKK followed through 
with its "ban" on Turkish journalists and newspaper offices by 
assassination and burning of offices, and was effective in 
shutting down original-source southeast independent 
journalistic reporting. 
In light of the earlier discussion concerning the Criminal Code 
and anti-terrorism laws within it, human rights violation 
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allegations against Turkish armed forces operating in the 
southeast, and political stagnation over the Kurdish question 
and its ramifications contrasted with the PKK polemic, it should 
be questioned to what degree misinformation is perhaps being 
disseminated by the Turkish Armed Forces. Misinformation could 
form an inaccurate picture of what strength and occupational 
hold the PKK might actually possess, and would impact on the 
overall Turkish political scene and relations with its Western 
allies. 
The Turkish public was improperly informed of the threat posed 
by the PKK to the country as early as the 12 September 1980 
military coup d'etat. Mentioned before, was General Kenan 
Evren 's statement, "the head of the snake has been crushed" 
(reference Chapter 2), in relation to "bandits" that had been 
captured or executed in raids during the coup. The PKK in its 
incipient latent form, actually managed to regroup outside the 
country. The line taken by Turkish government(s) from that point 
onward, was that insurgent rebels were being sponsored in 
neighboring states such as Iraq, Iran and Syria. A name was 
given to the "bandits" over time -- the PKK -- and Turkish 
intelligence ascertained that the PKK terrorist organization's 
network had instilled itself not only in the Middle East, but in 
Europe as well. The label "terrorist" organization originated in 
Ankara, but was accepted by Western governments. The 
terrorist appellation was disputed by various Kurdish factions 
outside and within Turkey who initially recognized the PKK as a 
liberation movement. However, focus on the part of the Turkish 
government(s) to the PKK threat occured as late as the 1986 
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period because the conventional threat orientation of the 
Turkish armed forces was to the north, i.e. the Soviet Union. It 
was some time before appropriations and release of 
information regarding the unconventional PKK threat filtered 
down into the mainstream through the government and the 
media. 
From the beginning of what would evolve into a huge battle 
between the PKK and the Turkish Armed Forces, many 
misleading statements were made by public officials who did 
not understand the polemic they encountered (i.e. beyond a 
"perceived threat"), and who were not aware of the real scope 
about the PKK threat to the southeast region of Turkey (i.e. the 
"real threat"). 
There have been remarks in the Turkish press as issued by the 
Turkish officials, including Defense Ministers, Prime Ministers and 
Presidents, which followed a course of rhetoric regarding the 
Turkish Armed Forces campaign against the PKK anti-terrorism 
campaign, purporting that operations pre-dating the Zaleh 
maneuvers (i.e. 1986 onward, reference Chapter 2), were 
successful in "breaking the back of the PKK", "eliminating the 
PKK", and "crushing the head of the snake". These statements 
were issued and have continued to be issued all the way 
through the present government of Prime Minister T ansu <;iller. 
Why is rhetoric over the PKK polemic portrayed in this manner? 
Political exigencies seem to be at the root of the cause. 
Because PKK insurgency has posed a very real threat for three 
successive governments in Turkey following the September 12, 
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1980 military coup, the eradication of the terrorist organization's 
hold over the southeast has become not only a political reality 
to be contended with, but a campaign issue as well. Body 
bags with dead Turkish soldiers have had to be reconciled 
through strong rhetoric indicating that the anti-PKK fight will 
soon yield results leading to the eradication of the terrorist 
organization. While body bags are a reality, the eradication of 
the PKK in the near-term is not. Portraying the elimination of the 
stronghold and continuing threat posed by PKK insurgency has 
been treated by Turkish government(s) as a near-term rather 
than long-term political issue. Proselytizing the Turkish public, 
who in essence are a highly politicized society is irresponsible 
behavior. Irregardless of the short-term gains -- if any at all --
achieved by such misinformation, the Turkish public gains 
nothing. The Turkish public is not ignorant. The public is attuned 
to issues, and a by-product of the governmental misinformation 
campaign has evolved into a somewhat inured Turkish public 
that is cynical about the progress of "gains" by the Turkish 
armed forces against the PKK. Such misinformation is confusing, 
and will likely -- as has proven to be the case with continued 
PKK raids on Turkish citizens, military personnel, villages, and 
schools -- backfire on the government's claims of success. 
What accounts for the variance in figures issued by the Turkish 
armed forces as opposed to those of independent journalists, 
and conversely, those of the PKK? Clearly, there is a 
propaganda war being waged on all fronts, and a mechanism 
through which to average-out figures does not exist. Some 
danger prevails in culminating a public response that does not 
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accurately reflect reality. An entire literature exists on this 
concept based on the U.S. experience in Vietnam. 
Conditioning of the public to accept the norms of what the 
armed forces of Turkey deem fit is the practice in the country 
today. The democratic, but strong military role and influence 
that prevails in the societal and governmental order in Turkey, 
conditioning of this type is accepted as fact. The unitary aims 
of holding together Turkey perhaps warrant the practice of 
government-issued information in the eyes of the powers that 
be, but the long-term gains to be achieved by such practice is 
questionable. The principle of the government's representation 
by and of the Turkish people is in question. Turkey is thus being 
portrayed abroad as a country where rights are systematically 
abused, rather than as a democratizing, Western-oriented one. 
Such misinformation expounded by the government thus has 
implications not only for the Turkish public, but for the 
reputation of Turkey and its relations in the West. 
Armed Forces PKK death and casualty figures do not go 
unquestioned in the Turkish press. However, attention to armed 
forces information oftentimes is polarized according to 
extremes within the political system. That is to say, the left, and 
left-oriented media is divided over the Kurdish question and 
critical of the right's policies, of the right and the rightist media, 
is staunchly in favor of the military solution to the PKK polemic 
and criticizes the left for its utopian and unpragmatic proposals 
towards addressing the Kurdish question. Casualties inflicted by 
Turkish Armed Forces against PKK militants is often featured in 
articles minus the component of questioning the accuracy of 
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government-issued figures. The issue of PKK terrorism is a 
controversial topic in the Turkish media and among citizens. 
Oftentimes, it seems that an objective analysis of the methods 
employed by the Armed Forces to help eradicate the 
insurgency are hard to procure as a result. Invariably, the issue 
of terrorism evokes emotionalism, and internationally, there are 
no "objective" criteria by which governments must operate. 
Norms are defined and practiced according to the political 
exigencies in individual countries. The case of Germany and 
Turkey vis-a-vis the PKK polemic and the larger Kurdish question 
seem to fit into this framework. That is, there are no objective 
criteria which Turkey is expected to operate except adherence 
to internatinal conventions on human rights. As discussed 
earlier, this is Turkey's biggest failing, and the human rights 
problem in Turkey has exacerbated the PKK and Kurdish 
question polemics to the extent that in the Western press, the 
two are not considered as mutually exclusive, but are instead 
inextricably intertwined and mired in the human rights issue. 
The relationship to terrorism as a threat and terrorism as a tool is 
complex. As discussed in this work, two polemics exist under the 
PKK threat and the Kurdish question with an overarching tanget 
affecting the two, human right violation allegations. It is 
interesting that the Kurdish question has in a sense ballooned 
into proportions such that it acts as a factor not only in 
domestic Turkish politics, but in Turkey's relations with Germany 
and other Western allies. The present government in Turkey 
consistently utilizes the PKK threat polemic as a litmus test to 
determine poltical primacy, and bolster the Turkish armed 
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forces. A parallel reinforcing this tendency may be found in 
other case studies. According to scholar Noemi Gal-Or, who 
has studied terrorism in Italy. Germany and Israel, terrorism can 
be exploited as a means to win in domestic political rivalries. 
Given the intense political party structure of Turkey (with 16 
parties participating in the March 1994 municipal elections), this 
is certainly a valid concern. In Germany, Italy and Israel, 
terrorism was abused and exploited to enhance electoral and 
power-political assets. The consistent emphasis on the need to 
distinguish the terrorists from terrorism -- the doers from their 
deeds -- further manifests the politicization of the anti-terrorist 
disposition./67 
The American scholar and intellectual Noam Chomsky has 
extensive commentary on the entrenching of conditioned 
societal responses to terrorism and how they become 
institutionalized as they pertain to American foreign policy,/68 
Chomsky's commentary bears scrutiny for a comparison to the 
Turkish public's response to PKK terrorism, which is controlled 
and filtered through the Turkish government's discretionary 
divulging of information. His work on the practice of 
governments' manufacturing of consent in their publics is also 
noteworthy as indexed to the Turkish case. Chomsky argues 
that Western governments set the agenda of events -- what 
has popularly become known as "spin control" in the United 
States -- and their portrayal so as to frame them for media 
"consumption". This is reflected in the way that governments 
issue war and conflict data (reference U.S. television coverage 
of the Persian Gulf War) so as to guide public opinion in a 
direction favorable to their policies and strategies. The notion of 
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who in the Turkish government is issuing the data and what 
mechanisms exist to countercheck the issuance of those data is 
relevant in the Turkish case. In this way, Chomsky's work bears 
scrutiny for the Turkish Government and Armed Forces issuing of 
PKK casualty data and their implications for the true status of 
the war against PKK terrorism. 
The media in Turkey and Germany have both contributed 
significantly to disseminating their respective governments' 
perspectives on the PKK polemic and the larger Kurdish 
question. The degree to which their attention to the polemics 
has any determining influence is questionable. It was discussed 
throughout the work that the Turkish government has failed to 
effectively promote the concept of the differentiation between 
the PKK threat and the Kurdish question, and that 
misinterpretation has sprialed to the degree that in Germany, 
despite the banning of the PKK in November 1993, there is still a 
widespread tendency to obfuscate the PKK threat posed to 
Turkey with the human rights violations issue. The separation of 
the press from the government is operative in varying degrees 
as practiced respectively in Germany and Turkey. The 
distinction remains clear however, that no matter what the 
orientation of the press, governmental relations exist on a 
separate level from those expounded in the media. Corollaries 
may be posited as to the trialectic influence of the media, 
public opinion, and governmental action, but may never be 
qualified in any concrete terms. The reality of the unique case 
posed by PKK separatist insurrection in southeast Turkey, 
however, has been treated by the media in such a way as to 
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heighten rhetoric, form biased public opinion, and perhaps, 
make combating the PKK threat and finding a long-term 
answer to the Kurdish question more difficult. A question 
remains as to where the future of Turkish-German relations lie in 
the face of the complexity of events posed by the PKK polemic 
and the Kurdish question. A discussion of how German-Turkish 
relations might evolve in the near and long term will be 
discussed in Chapter 4, summarizing how as factors the PKK 
polemic and the larger Kurdish question influenced the two 
states' relations over the past decade. 
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Chapter 4: Future Prospects 
The future of Turkish-German relations seemingly revolve around 
the issues discussed; use of security forces and armament, the 
impact on Turkish-Kurd civilians in the PKK-Turkish armed forces 
war zone of the southeast, and purported human rights abuses 
and allegations of torture by security forces. The way the issues 
are focused on media and public reaction to coverage will 
also perhaps influence the course of Turkey-Germany relations 
in the long term. 
The tone that has been established with regard to the polemic 
posed by the PKK is that Turkey, a decidedly important Western 
ally, is experiencing an excruciating battle with an organized 
insurgency organization. The ethnicity argument injected into 
the Kurdish question by the Germans has become a major issue 
in addition to allegations of systematic abuse of human rights, 
complicating the course that Turkey will experience in its 
relations with Germany and other Western allies. Dialogue 
regarding the predicament of Turkish-Kurds in Turkey's southeast 
will likely continue between the Turkish government and the 
Western allies. The problem of how to ascertain at which point 
a dialogue might translate into action on the part of the Turkish 
government will take into consideration many variables. Any 
outcome over the Kurdish question in Turkey seems 
unpredictable in the long-term. The timetable for such a 
dialogue and process however, will be delayed as long as the 
PKK organization continues to effectively perpetuate its bloody 
campaign and succeeds in increasing the Turkish armed forces 
use of strength to combat it. The cycle is a vicious and 
repetitive one; seemingly pointing in the direction of a non-
solution until "every last PKK terrorist is killed", along with 
thousands of civilian casualties in their wake. 
It can not be established concretely as to whether political 
reforms would in any way impact the effectiveness rate of the 
PKK in garnering support or sympathy. Similarly, the benefits of 
such reforms might not be immediately appreciable or 
apparent to the Turkish government or public, because the 
climate is currently oriented toward eradicating PKK terrorism at 
any cost. Additionally, there is a great sense of tension within 
the country and with other states over the PKK terror campaign 
and its unfortunate linkage with the larger Kurdish question, as 
discussed in relation to the German case. The granting of a 
unique set of privileges to Turkish-Kurds given the non-
recognition of minorities in Turkey does not appear likely in the 
near-term. 
The continued mandate of Operation Provide Comfort will 
continue to be controversial, although the Turkish Government 
has reaffirmed through renewal of the mandate that it is the 
most efficient means of monitoring the various Kurdish factions 
in the safehaven zone, and for gleaning useful intelligence 
information regarding PKK terrorists in the region. 
As Turkish governments have made their intentions toward 
democratizing and administering Western practice and norms 
clear, it becomes all the more significant that they continue to 
work toward further improving the image and record of Turkey 
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in terms of human rights, particularly with reference to criminal 
proceedings and ensuring the rights guaranteed in the Turkish 
Constitution. Included among the tenets in the Constitution that 
are not currently upheld is promoting the preservation of 
human rights for all citizens, eradicating the practice of torture, 
and guaranteeing the freedoms of speech, press, 
demonstration, and expression of ideas (as contained in Articles 
26, 28, 34, and 25 of the Constitution respectively). Democratic 
and reform objectives in Turkey could be balanced with the 
overarching need of the government(s) to maintain civil order 
in the face of the terrorist threat posed by the PKK and 
sympathizers associated with it. Turkey's task is not an easy one, 
but if the government is to be held accountable for truly 
progressing along democratic lines and following the tenets 
laid out in its 1982 Constitution, it will necessarily need to 
continue working towards improvement in these areas of 
weakness. 
The NATO member relationship shared by Turkey and Germany 
might in many ways manifest itself into helping to eradicate 
PKK terrorism as an international terrorist threat. While the PKK 
terror campaign is being waged internally in Turkey's southeast, 
NATO can serve to assist the Turkish Government and Armed 
Forces in accordance with its defined role; 
In accordance with the Strategic Concept, NATO's role is not 
only to defend its members' territory but also to provide one of 
the indispensible foundations for a stable security environment 
in Europe. The Alliance also serves as a transatlantic forum for 
Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, 
including possible developments posing risks for members' 
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security, and for appropriate coordination of their efforts in 
fields of common concern,/69 
NATO will likely continue to work toward the eradication of 
international terrorism and indeed emphasizes the need for 
further cooperative activities between members to advance 
that cause; 
"We condemn all acts of international terrorism. They constitute 
flagrant violations of human dignity and rights and are a threat 
to the conduct of normal international relations. In accordance 
with our national legislation, we stress the need for the most 
effective cooperation possible to prevent and suppress this 
scourge.· /70 
As bilateral cooperation through NA TO has been exercised 
between Turkey and Europe, and Turkey and the United States, 
this duality will likely continue to be the path that is followed 
toward improving Turkey's image, reputation and relations with 
its Western allies. A sustained level of bilateral cooperation over 
combating the PKK both diplomatically and militarily has been 
exhibited over the past ten years. It is evident by the 
effectiveness with which European governments pursued PKK 
activists during the 1993 June and November raids that 
intelligence exchange between Turkey and Europe is 
significant. The fact that 35 PKK-affiliated organizations in 
Germany alone were banned and closed down, is also 
testimony to the fact that the threat of PKK activity on 
Germany's territory existed and was tracked through 
surveillance and intelligence activity. Diplomacy has been a 
significant factor in setting a more reasonable course for the 
continuation of positive relations, working to help avoid 
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misconceptions between the two states and their citizenry. 
Diplomacy has, in the case of Turkish-German relations, been 
instrumental in keeping the two countries on course, so as to 
avoid blow-ups that easily could have occurred over the 
rightist attacks in Germany against Turks in 1993, or the 
suspension of arms-transfers to Turkey over allegations of 
human rights abuses by the Turkish security forces in 1993 and 
1994. However, diplomacy success and failure rates are 
scarcely measurable, and form but one component in 
governmental relations between Turkey and Germany. The PKK 
terror problem has been handled by the Turkish government(s) 
in a somewhat inconsistent and oftentimes unorganized 
manner, and has reflected into the Turkish diplomatic missions 
abroad, impacting substantially on their effectiveness in 
handling the PKK polemic amidst foreign government relations. 
Contrary to the sentiment so often expressed in Turkey that "the 
only friends of Turkey are the Turks", there is actually a great 
deal of interest in the West in seeing Turkey succeed along the 
path toward full democratization, industrialization and regional 
influence. There exists little or no anxiety as to whether Turkey 
will take an opposite course, because Turkey has guaranteed 
its allies' trust through the many reforms and progresses it has 
exhibited in the past decade alone. The Turkish government(s) 
for its part, can prove further progressiveness by initiating a self-
critique over its handling of the separate and distinct issues of 
the PKK polemic and the Kurdish question; the government 
may assume responsibility for finding a democratic solution to 
the problems posed, rather than pointing the finger at other 
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countries for promoting PKK interests either indirectly or directly. 
The answer to the problems lay within Turkey alone, and not 
within conspiracies plotted by foreign states to destabilize the 
republic. Outside interference and infiltration into the PKK 
polemic and the Kurdish question, solutions to the root causes 
of the continuing insurgency movement, lie within the borders 
of Turkey. 
In the case of the Turkish government's accusation of direct 
sponsorship of the PKK, there is evidence of terrorist harboring in 
Syria's Bekaa Valley, and in Iran and Iraq whose regimes are 
hostile to Turkey's policies on a number of issues. Turkey is fully 
pursuing a dialogue to trigger a response favorable to 
expunging the PKK terrorist elements in all three countries. Such 
efforts have become a major push in the drive to eradicate 
PKK terror in Turkey's southeast. Turkey will continue to pursue 
that course carefully so as not to cause the undesired effect of 
a reverse on the gains already achieved. A case in point was 
demonstrated when the Syrian government told the Turkish 
government in 1993 that it would hand over to Turkey the PKK 
leader Abdullah Ocalan "if it could catch him". The Iranian and 
Iraqi governments have been similarly enlisted to engage in the 
pursuit of PKK terrorists and to extradite them to Turkey, with 
some positive rapprochement evidenced in T urkish-lran 
relations in 1993. 
In the case of accusations regarding indirect assistance to the 
PKK, such as European-based PKK-affiliated organizations 
which were legal until 1993, it should be understood that those 
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organizations were legal under European constitutional law. 
When the level of diplomacy and an actual threat to European 
security was experienced in relation to those organizations, 
they were banned in November 1993 in Germany and France. 
The bannings exhibited the fact that the European 
governments were very interested in cooperating with Turkey to 
eradicate the PKK threat on their soil, but required a legal 
reason and political mandate to do so. Turkey's continued 
blaming of other countries and particularly Germany for its 
liberal constitutional ideals, missed the larger target of blaming 
itself for porous and insecure borders in the early 1980s, and an 
ill-equipped means of combating the PKK due to the fact that 
successive Turkish governments realized too late the threat that 
the insurgent group posed to the country's southeast. The 
political expediency afforded to blaming the PKK problem on 
other countries while the root cause laid in Turkey has been 
maximized to its full potential. However, that practice on the 
Turkish government's part will likely take another direction, as 
the European "indirect sponsors" of PKK terrorism took a firm 
stand in 1993 against the organization by banning it and 
affiliated groups. 
It would be utopic to assume that Turkey could only rely on its 
Western allies in maintaining its sovereignty and role in the 
region. Turkey must at the same time pursue a course that 
allows it to mete out new interests and causes -- as evidenced 
in the role it has taken with regard to the Bosnian cause in light 
of the war in ex-Yugoslavia -- as well as its interest in developing 
mutual projects toward the development of the former Soviet 
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states of Central Asia. Turkey can also pursue an even-handed 
policy toward maintaining respectable relations with Middle 
Eastern states so as not to foment any more anxiety over the 
secular versus shari' ah system debate so often a point of 
contention as Turkey moves ever toward democratization while 
also working to preseNe its Muslim identity. Turkey, given its 
geographical location and history, will continue to play out a 
difficult and controversial balancing act to keep its territory and 
democratic system in tact. 
Turkish-German relations in the near-term will likely continue to 
be impacted by the PKK polemic and the larger Kurdish 
question. Despite the PKK terror problem, Turkish-German 
relations primarily rotate around trade, which at times 
intermingles with political debate but more often, remains a 
separate sphere. As Turkey enters the Customs Union in 1996, it 
will become a contender in an arena in which it may prove its 
competence and competitiveness. Regional cooperation will 
also likely be a means through which Turkish-German relations 
might progress, particularly in the development of the newly-
emerging states of Central Asia. While Turkey has desired to 
take a leading role in Central Asia given its Turkic affiliation 
there, it does not have the economic means through which to 
pursue its aims of development assistance in the region. Turkey 
could therefore work as a guiding cultural affinity presence in 
Central Asia together with Germany to invest and develop, 
and work toward a mutually-beneficial relationship in the 
region. Germany's interest in such a proposition remains to be 
defined, as its sets its interests toward the development of and 
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in the East European economies. The political and foreign 
policy exigencies in both Turkey and Germany will determine 
which course such economically-tied relations may pursue. 
The Turkish-German relationship can further progress toward a 
fruitful partnership based on intelligence and information 
sharing on the PKK problem. It is clear by 1993-1994 events in 
relation to PKK attacks in Europe that the level of intelligence 
was significant enough to determine where PKK-affiliated 
organizations existed and what kinds of operations were being 
conducted through them. The number of suspected 
connections and routes of operation connected with the PKK 
terror campaign are also significant enough so as to warrant 
even more intense cooperation between the two 
governments. The obvious area of narcotics smuggling is a 
crucial area in making a large dent in the PKK organization, as 
it is the means through which substantial finances are raised to 
procure weapons in Europe and the Middle East. 
The level of intelligence cooperation being facilitated in the 
United States in addition to Europe regarding the PKK threat in 
Turkey is significant. It is suspected that the United States was 
instrumental in stepping-up the European response to PKK-
affiliated organizations through urging stronger measures to be 
taken by European allies and by putting the PKK terror 
campaign on the agenda as a serious threat to international 
terrorism. This is evidenced by the fact that on the first page of 
its 1993 World Terrorism Report, the United States State 
Department cited that the PKK and its activities in Turkey, 
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Europe and the Middle East changed the downward trend of 
terrorism in the world./71 
By helping to bring the PKK polemic to the forefront and 
expose it as the number one terrorist organization in the world, 
the United States prompted a strong and long-term response 
beginning in 1993 by Germany, France, Belgium and the United 
Kingdom to do their share in combating PKK terrorism. The fact 
that the PKK came to be perceived as an international rather 
than localized threat to Turkey was a huge evolution in what 
will hopefully continue among Western governments. The trend 
toward prosecution of PKK-affiliated activities and crimes 
perpetrated through murders, arms smuggling, narcotics trade, 
extortion, and propagandizing, will allow the German, French, 
and U.S. governments, among others to become even more 
active in insuring that a smaller number of recruits is enlisted to 
the PKK cause outside of Turkey. 
Similarly, the enhanced attention paid by the West to the 
reality of the PKK threat internationally will likely be evidenced 
in the media mirroring of the true cause of the PKK and serve to 
separate it from the distinct issue of the Kurdish question and its 
ramifications for Turkish-Kurds' cultural advancement. Perhaps 
this will only occur in the event that targets other than Kurds 
and Turks are aimed at by the PKK, but that view supposes that 
the PKK is only a Turkish problem. It would be a sad fact that it 
would take additional deaths, perhaps in Europe or elsewhere, 
to prompt a more international full-fledged reaction. In reality, 
the PKK polemic has already transcended the Turkish dimension 
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into an international one. Increased international attention to 
Turkey's human rights record in relation to Turkish armed forces 
anti-terrorism maneuvers against the PKK will hopefully move 
the debate in Turkey in a more positive and less defensive 
direction, thereby instigating reforms in current Turkish armed 
forces practice. The fact that linkage has so often been made 
in the Western press between the PKK polemic and the Kurdish 
question only exacerbates the Turkish armed forces and 
government(s) predicament and allowed them to assume a 
defensive posture and self-justification of blaming other 
countries for assisting the rise and strength of the PKK. Self-
evaluation and reform in Turkey will hopefully win out, 
prompting a more open and effective approach to 
eradicating the PKK in Turkey's southeast and in Europe, and 
hopefully will also lend itself toward a continued and healthier 
debate on the Kurdish question and its ramifications for Turkish-
Kurds. 
Through increased intelligence agency concentration, 
surveillance, and countersubversion activities among the 
Western allies to combat PKK terrorism in Turkey and abroad, 
the road toward improved state relations will increasingly be 
paved. Turkey's political system and economy could be 
significantly improved if the draining resources to combat PKK 
terrorism could be drawn down. Similarly, Turkey could turn its 
attention to fully concentrating on the advancement of its 
democratic system and the instillation of the beliefs and norms 
it has long strived toward as a secular, democratic nation. 
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The PKK issue will continue to be on the Turkey-Germany state 
relation agenda. The Kurdish question and its implications for 
possible reforms towards cultural, educational and media rights 
for Turkish-Kurds remains in mid-air in the midst of the pressing 
PKK threat. Much has occurred in the 1993-1994 period which 
demonstrates that through enhanced cooperation and 
coordination of political aims, Turkey and Germany can work 
together to diminish the number of events perpetrated by the 
PKK and to educate their publics that the dialogue on the 
Kurdish question merits continued discussion. The education 
element is essential and works in tandem with the struggle to 
eradicate the PKK, because it is only through a continued 
dialogue on and practice of democratization, and particularly 
how it is inculcated and practiced in Turkey that Turkish-
German state relations will continue on a path toward 
understanding and cooperation. 
106 
Alll:ent t.:niversii, 
Library 
